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I. INTRODUCTION
The use of drug testing to deter drug use is not a new phenome-
non. In the proper setting, drug testing is a necessary device to ensure
public safety or to eradicate a drug problem-. The expansion of drug
testing to all facets of society, especially to activities that do not in-
volve public safety, is a troubling development that has serious impli-
cations for privacy rights.'
1. Humorist Art Buchwald satirized the fears surrounding the expansion of drug test-
ing:
It all started when someone came up with the idea of testing horses for drugs.
Then somebody else said, "As long as we're doing it for horses, why don't
we test football players?" It seemed like a good idea until baseball teams com-
plained that if the authorities were screening football players, they should do the
same for baseball players. The track stars said that they wanted to be in on it
too, and before you knew it, they were testing basketball players, croquet teams,
wrestlers, and bowlers.
A female volleyball team in Alaska went to the State Supreme Court com-
plaining that men were being tested ten times as often as women. The court ruled
that women were entitled to equal drug tests under the law.
Although the dope screening started in sports, it soon hit the civilian popula-
tion.
Politicians urged that every schoolchild in America be tested. Corporations
gave all employees little paper cups as they lined up for their paychecks.
Banks demanded drug checks on customers in exchange for mortgages. No
one could use a credit card unless he had a favorable report from the lab.
The Army, Navy, Air Force, and the Marines declared mandatory testing for
our boys in uniform. And the White House ordered everyone from the Secretary
of State to the lowly Secretary of Agriculture to bring in samples before a cabinet
meeting.
President Reagan declared that everybody in Nicaragua had to be tested by
the Contras, who were already tested by the CIA.
There was some hell to pay when the White House leaked the story that all
heads of state would have to take a drug test before they met with the President.
Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher was particularly disturbed when they sent her a
kit in the diplomatic pouch.
To show that there was nothing to it, President Reagan took the test. As
everyone suspected, the President passed it with flying colors, and Nancy was
shown giving him a kiss when the results were announced.
Drug screening became the most serious obstacle to foreign relations.
One of the big stumbling blocks to holding a summit concerned the question
of whether or not Gorbachev would take a drug test. The Soviets insisted that
Mr. Reagan had to take their word that Gorbachev was not on dope. The Ameri-
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Despite drug testing's beneficent purposes, it is an invasion that has
been challenged in many courts. When assessing the legality of drug-
testing programs, courts must attempt to balance the invasive nature of
drug testing against its benefits to society.
In 1986, the governing body of major college athletics, the Na-
tional Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA),2 implemented a random
drug-testing program.3 The program imposed sanctions on athletes who
tested positive on a urine test for drugs banned by the NCAA.4
cans held out for on-site inspection.
Not only the White House but other branches of government are now insist-
ing on checks for drug use. Congressional candidates are filming commercials
holding up the results of their tests on television and demanding their opponents
do the same.
A suggestion to have the nine members of the Supreme Court take a test
before deciding a case was greeted with stoney silence by the Court. That is
because the Supreme Court will have to decide whether mandatory screening is
constitutional or not. And if they take the test and fail, they could be held in
contempt.
I don't wish to give the impression that everyone in Washington is being
checked on a regular basis.
Many of us are just being subjected to random testing when we're in a pub-
lic place.
I've been randomly tested only three times - once when I was drinking from
a public water fountain outside Jesse Helms' office, once when I bought boxer
shorts at Bloomingdale's, and once when I asked Attorney General Ed Meese at a
press conference if he was having trouble understanding the Constitution of the
United States.
ART BUCHWALD, The Test, in I THINK I DON'T REMEMBER 232-35 (1985) (reprinted with
permission).
2. The NCAA is an unincorporated association of colleges and universities that is the
governing body of intercollegiate athletics. GLENN M. WONG, ESSENTIALS OF AMATEUR
SPORTS LAW 2 (1988). As such, the NCAA sanctions participation in intercollegiate athletics
and sponsors championships in dozens of sports. Id. at 3. Among its myriad duties, the
NCAA promulgates and enforces rules governing competition, participation and eligibility in
its sports. Id.
3. NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLErIc ASS'N, 1986-87 DRUG-TESTING PROGRAM (1986)
[hereinafter NCAA 1986-87 PROGRAM]. The program became effective August 1, 1986. Id.
at 5. For a further discussion of the 1986-87 program and the initial legal challenges to it,
see Stephen F. Brock & Kevin M. McKenna, Drug Testing in Sports, 92 DICK. L. REV.
505, 523-43, 545-51 (1988).
4. The suspension of two football players in 1987 illustrates some of the consequenc-
es in a positive drug test. George Mira and John O'Neill, two outstanding players for the
University of Miami, tested positive for diuretics. Sally Jenkins, Hurricanes' Mira, O'Neill
Not Granted Injunction Sit Out Game, WASH. POST, January 2, 1988, at D4. The NCAA's
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Many of the NCAA's member universities have implemented drug-
testing programs similar to the NCAA's program. Because most uni-
versities model their drug-testing programs after the NCAA's program,
the university programs share many of the same programmatic and
legal defects as the NCAA's program. In challenges to the drug-testing
programs, courts have addressed whether drug testing impermissibly
invades the athlete's privacy. This Article will examine the evolution
of the NCAA's drug-testing program. The Article will then review and
analyze the most significant challenges to the NCAA and university
drug-testing programs.6 The Article will conclude with an analysis of
the various tests, defenses and defects of drug-testing programs.
II. THE NCAA's DRUG-TESTING PROGRAM
The following Section will address the reasons behind drug testing
college athletes, and will analyze relevant parts of the NCAA's drug-
Executive Committee denied the players' appeals. Id. Judge Michael Salmon of Dade County
Court in Florida then declined to grant an injunction, which would have allowed Mira and
O'Neill to play in the 1988 Orange Bowl game, stating the injunction would be moot be-
cause University of Miami officials would have barred Mira and O'Neill's participation,
regardless of the injunction. Id. The University's position stemmed from its fear of forfeiting
both the title and revenues earned from the Orange Bowl if they used the two ineligible
players. Id. The institution's penalty in connection with a positive test could have involved
the forfeiture of any awards or revenues and the deletion of any records. See NATIONAL
COLLEGIATE ATHLErIC ASS'N, 1992-93 DRUG TESTING/EDUCATION PROGRAMS 12, Bylaw
31.2.3.5 (Martin T. Benson ed., 1992) [hereinafter NCAA 1992-93 PROGRAM].
5. The issue confronting the NCAA and its member'institutions was framed by Judge
Joseph Bellipanni of the Colorado District Court in Boulder County:
The rights protected by the Fourth Amendment and [cognate state statutes] are
essential to a free society. Drug abuse is a very significant problem which can and
does devastate the lives of many members of this society ....
It is essential, however, that even sincere, legitimate concerns not be allowed
to dull the vigilant defense of the values protected by the Constitution.
Derdeyn v. University of Colorado, No. 86-CV-2245-3, at 12 (Colo. Dist Ct. Aug. 22,
1989) [hereinafter Derdeyn 1].
6. The NCAA's recommendation that universities confer with "legal counsel at an
early stage, particularly in regard to right to privacy statutes, which may vary from one
state and locale to another" suggests that the NCAA was aware that its program would
likely be challenged. NCAA 1986-87 PROGRAM, supra note 3, at 19.
1994]
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testing program and significant changes to it.7 There are several rea-
sons used to justify drug testing college athletes: 1) to prevent the
health problems associated with drug use; 2) to prevent young people
from emulating college athletes by using drugs; and 3) to preserve
athletic competition on an equal footing. Drug use by college athletes
may cause significant health problems and threatens the integrity of
athletic competition.8 Drug use by athletes impairs fair athletic compe-
tition because performance may be enhanced by the use of some
drugs." The most widely abused performance-enhancing drugs are ana-
bolic steroids. Anabolic steroids cause serious health problems for col-
lege athletes who use them outside of a medically supervised, thera-
peutic context.' ° Beyond the immediate adverse consequences to an
athlete's health, drug use by college athletes at such a developmental
age can have harmful repercussions throughout an athlete's life."
There are also possible adverse consequences of drug use to others
not directly associated with college athletics. Because college athletics
are popular and profitable, they are often viewed as role models for
peers and children. 2 As a result, publicized reports of drug use by
7. This Article will focus on the NCAA's program because most universities have the
same or similar reasons for testing and have adopted the same or similar programs.
8. An athlete's health and safety may be imperiled by not only side effects from
drug use, but also from use during athletic competition. At least one court has addressed the
danger to athletes of drug use during competition. See Hill v. NCAA, 865 P.2d 633, 678
(Cal. 1994) (George, J., concurring & dissenting) [hereinafter Hill 111].
9. See NCAA 1992-93 PROGRAM, supra note 4, at 9. The language accompanying the
NCAA drug-testing legislation mentions the preservation of fair competition first and refers
to it as an "ideal" to which the NCAA is dedicated. Id.
10. See Norma M. Reddig, Note, Anabolic Steroids: The Price of Pumping Up, 37
WAYNE L. REV. 1647, 1647-48 (1991) (claiming steroids are dangerous performance-enhanc-
ing drugs). Among the various side effects of steroid use are: liver damage, hepatitis, in-
creased cancer risk, sterility, addiction, psychological imbalances and strokes. Id. at 1649-50.
11. If drug use is left undiscovered and unchecked at the collegiate level, it may be
perpetuated throughout an athlete's life. For instance, National Football League (NFL) player
Lyle Alzado died of cancer brought on by heavy steroid use that began in college. Maryann
Hudson, Lyle Alzado Is Dead at 43 of Cancer, L.A. TIMES, May 15, 1992, at Cl.
Many college athletes use performance-enhancing drugs to become professionals and
must continue to use them in order to retain their jobs. This leads to a never ending cycle
of steroid abuse.
12. See generally Schaill v. Tippecanoe County Sch. Corp., 864 F.2d 1309, 1320-21
(7th Cir. 1988) (finding drug use by high school athletes tended to influence others to use
drugs). See also Stephen F. Brock & Kevin McKenna, Drug Testing in Sports, 92 DICK. L.
6
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college athletes may contribute to drug use by young children who
seek to emulate them.
The twin aims of the NCAA's program are to protect the health
and safety of the student-athlete and to preserve fair competition.13 To
accomplish these goals, the NCAA established a list of banned drugs.
The NCAA requires student-athletes to consent to be tested at post-
season competitions for any of the banned drugs. The NCAA penalizes
all student-athletes who test positive for a banned substance.14 A pos-
itive drug test does not result in penalties to the athlete's team, unless
the university either failed to declare the athlete ineligible after a posi-
tive test or the university knowingly allowed the athlete to compete
after a positive drug test.15 In either situation, the team would forfeit
its championship finish and any revenue derived from winning or par-
ticipating in the event.16 The fear of team sanctions and loss of cham-
pionship revenue are concerns that have motivated universities to im-
plement their own drug-testing programs.
The NCAA banned the use of over three thousand substances. 7
The list of banned substances contained a "prescription exception" for
the use of commonly used medications, such as asthma and bronchitis
REV. 505 (1988).
13. See Hill 11I, 865 P.2d 633, 659 (Cal. 1994).
14. NCAA 1986-87 PROGRAM, supra note 3, at 2-5. Under the program, student-ath-
letes who tested positive lost their eligibility to participate in intercollegiate athletics. In
1986, 32 players were banned from NCAA post-season competitions for positive drug tests.
Douglas Lederman, 32 Football Players Failed NCAA Drug Tests Last Fall, CHRON. HIGHER
EDUC., Mar. 16, 1988, at A39. In 1987, it was revealed that 24 players were suspended
from NCAA Division I football bowl games for failing NCAA drug tests. Id. In 1988, only
four players were banned for failing drug tests. Id
From January 1992 to June 1992, one-half of one percent of all tested NCAA ath-
letes failed drug tests. Very Few Athletes Fail Drug-Testing Program, NCAA NEWS, Sept. 2,
1992, at 6. Of the 5,157 tested in Division I, 13 football players failed the urine test and
another 20 failed to take the test. Id. Of the remaining student-athletes, only two Division I
indoor track team competitors failed the tests. Id
15. NCAA 1992-93 PROGRAM, supra note 9, 9, at 12, Bylaw 31.2.3.5.
16. Id. For a further discussion of the penalties to a university for allowing an ineligi-
ble athlete to compete, see supra note 4.
17. The substances were divided into six classifications: stimulants, anabolic steroids,
substances banned in rifle competitions, diuretics, street drugs, peptide hormones and ana-
logues. NCAA 1986-87 PROGRAM, supra note 3, at 3, Exec. Reg. 1-7-(b).
1994]
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medicines.'8 Later versions of the program expanded the exception,
allowing athletes to declare their use of other medically necessary
drugs. Athletes that signed the declaration could not be punished for
using commonly available medication.'9  A student-athlete's first
contact with the NCAA's program occurs before the competitive season
begins. Student-athletes must sign consent forms agreeing to be tested
for banned drugs before they can participate in intercollegiate athlet-
ics.20 An athlete's failure to sign the consent form results in ineligibil-
ity to participate in all intercollegiate sports.2
With one exception, student-athletes were only tested at post-sea-
son competitions.22 Originally, athletes were selected for testing based
on: a random draw; the athlete's position of finish in the post-season
competition; suspicion of drug use by NCAA officials; or by the
amount of an. athlete's playing timeY The NCAA eliminated all sus-
picion-based testing in 1990.4 Athletes who were chosen for testing
had to urinate in front of a monitor,' after which their urine was
tested for the presence of any prohibited substances. If a banned sub-
stance was detected in the athlete's urine, the athlete lost eligibility to
participate in intercollegiate athletics for varying periods of time, de-
18. Id. Exec. Reg. 1-7-(c).
19. NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASS'N, 1987-88 DRUG-TESTING PROGRAM 9,
Exec. Reg. 1-7-(c) (1987) [hereinafter NCAA 1987-88 PROGRAM]. Under the 1987-88 pro-
gram, the list of acceptable medicines, including those approved to combat asthma or exer-
cise-induced bronchospasm, was expanded. Id. Also the use of sympathomimetic amines, a
category including over-the-counter cold and diet medications, could be declared before uri-
nalysis. Id. at 10. As a practical result, these measures lessened the draconian penalties that
could have been imposed for the use of several common over-the-counter drugs.
The "prescription exception" in the 1992-93 program applies to drugs banned for
rifle competitions and drugs classified as diuretics. NCAA 1992-93 PROGRAM, supra note
9, 9, at 12, Bylaw 31.2.3.2. The bylaw states that athletes who prove they have a medical
need for the regular use of these banned substances will not be considered to have produced
a positive test. Id.
20. NCAA 1986-87 PROGRAM, supra note 3, at 2 (amending NCAA CONST., art. 3, §
9-(i)).
21. Id
22. Id at 11, § 2.1.1. For a discussion of the one exception, year-round steroid
testing, see infra 28-33 and accompanying text.
23. Id at 13, §§ 4.2, 4.3.
24. NCAA 1992-93 PROGRAM, supra note 9, 9, at 17, §§ 4.2, 4.3.
25. Id at 19, § 6.2.3.
[Vol. 97:53
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pending on previous violations and the type of drug used.26 A sus-
pended athlete could regain eligibility by passing a drug test that could
be conducted by the NCAA at any time during the athlete's period of
ineligibility.27
The most significant addition to the NCAA's drug-testing program
since its inception was the 1990 adoption of mandatory, year-round
testing for steroids in Division I football.28 The year-round program
originally applied only to Division I football, but the NCAA now tests
Division I, I-A, and I-AA football players.29 In 1992, the NCAA also
implemented year-round steroid testing in Division I Men and
Women's track and field." The mandatory program replaced a volun-
tary, off-season testing program in place since January, 1989."' The
steroid testing program was designed to stop the use of steroids which
were considered the most serious substance abuse problem because
most of the positive drug tests were for steroids.32 The program was
also designed to detect the use of training drugs, which were usually
26. NCAA 1986-87 PROGRAM, supra note 3, at 2-3 (amending NCAA Const. art. 5, §
2).
27. NCAA 1992-93 PROGRAM, supra note 9, 9, at 22; Drug-Testing Program Protocol
Changes Listed, NCAA NEWS, May 23, 1990, at 7. Ineligible athletes were also subject to a
mandatory "exit test' during the last month of their period of ineligibility. Id.
28. Year-Round Drug-Testing Plan Aimed at Stopping Steroid Use, NCAA NEws, May
23, 1990, at 1 [hereinafter Year-Round Drug Testing]. Section 1.3.1.1 of the NCAA's pro-
gram provides that "[b]eginning August 1, 1990, and continuing through the conclusion of
the 1991-92 academic year, non-championship and non-bowl testing will be limited to anabo-
lic steroids, diuretics and other urine manipulators." NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASS'N,
1990-91 DRUG TESTiNG/EDUCATION PROGRAMS 11, § 1.3.1.1 (Laura E. Bollig ed., 1990)
[hereinafter NCAA 1990-91 PROGRAM.
29. Year-Round Drug Testing, supra note 28, at 1. The NCAA has stated that the
further expansion of steroid testing may be wan-anted, as football players in Division II and
III championships have tested positive for steroids. Id. at 6. In the NCAA, athletic programs
compete in a variety of divisions, depending on their competitiveness and size. See 1991-92
NATIONAL COLLEGIATE AmET7C ASS'N MANUAL 339-63, Bylaw 20. There are five divi-
sions: Division I; Division I-A; Division I-AA; Division II; and Division III. Id. at 339.
Generally the largest universities, public and private, compete on the Division I or I-A level,
while the Division I-AA, II and III schools are smaller and less athletically oriented.
30. Year-Round Testing Begins for Track and Field, NCAA NEWS, July 22, 1992, at
6. Selection is conducted on a random basis. Id.
31. Year-Round Drug Testing, supra note 28, at 1.
32. For example, in 1989, seven of twelve positive tests under the NCAA's postseason
testing program involved football players who used anabolic steroids. Id.
9
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detected at postseason championship because steroids are generally
taken in the offseason during training for the upcoming season.3
Steroid testing differs from standard drug testing in that steroids
are detected by inferring that the presence of abnormal hormonal levels
in the urine is caused by steroid use. Originally, an athlete with a
testosterone to epitestosterone (T/E) ratio of 6:1 was considered to have
tested positive for steroids; subsequently, the test was amended to ac-
count for naturally unusual T/E ratios. 4 The new standard called for
additional testing when a student had a T/E ratio between 6:1 and
8.99:1. 35 Unfortunately, the steroids tests are imprecise and can be
easily beaten, therefore, their accuracy and efficiency have been ques-
tioned.
While university drug-testing programs are far from uniform, most
are modelled after the NCAA's program. The university programs
generally share the NCAA's interests in protecting the health and safe-
ty of athletes and preserving fair competition. Universities also have
the added interest in ensuring the eligibility of their athletes for post-
season competition. Many university-sponsored drug-testing programs
follow the NCAA's program in its entirety, including the use of the
NCAA's drug test, procedures and list of banned drugs. 7
The cases that are discussed below illustrate various nuances of
university drug-testing programs. Some university programs include:
provisions for tests based on reasonable suspicion; release of test re-
sults to a variety of individuals without confidentiality guarantees;
aural, instead of visual monitoring; and different sanctions for positive
33. Id
34. NCAA 1992-93 PROGRAM, supra note 9, 9, at 14, Bylaw 31.2.3.1(g).
35. Id A subsequent test revealing a ratio of 6:1 or lower counted as a negative test,
while a ratio of 9:1 or greater counted as a positive test and subjected the student to full
sanctions. Id
36. Regardless of the ratio, experts suggest that the test can be fooled. Maryann Hud-
son, Steroid Resea-ch Coming up Short, L.A. Timms, June 11, 1992, at Cl. One expert on
steroid use, Dr. Mouro DiPasquale, claimed that the injection or ingestion of epitestosterone
would fool the test. Id In fact, DiPasquale asserted that a drop of epitestosterone on the
tongue was sufficient to deceive the test. Id. There are also commercial, over-the-counter
substances which are alleged to mask the presence of steroids in urine. See id
37. See, e.g., Viu.AovA UNIVERSrrY DRUG TESTING PROGRAM (1989).
[Vol. 97:53
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drug tests. The outcome of challenges to drug-testing programs vary
depending on the components of the program and the law applied.
III. THE LEGAL CHALLENGES TO NCAA- AND UNIVERSITY-
SPONSORED DRUG-TESTING PROGRAMS
Drug-testing programs have been challenged in two ways: under a state
privacy law; or, when the drug testing program is conducted by state
actors under the Fourth Amendment or its state constitution equivalent.
In order to assess the legality of drug-testing programs, it is useful to
develop the legal background to the challenges and to examine and
compare the four major challenges to the drug testing of college ath-
letes. From that background, several principles that govern the legality
of drug-testing programs can be elucidated.
At the collegiate level, courts have reached a variety of results. In
Hill v. NCAA,38 the Supreme Court of California upheld the NCAA's
drug testing program. In University of Colorado v. Derdeyn,39 the Su-
preme Court of Colorado invalidated the University of Colorado's (CU)
drug-testing program. In the State of Washington, O'Halloran v. Uni-
versity of Washington0 involved the drug-testing programs of both the
University of Washington (UW) and the NCAA, and ultimately result-
ed in a settlement restricting UW from conducting its program. In
Bally v. Northeastern University,4 the Supreme Judicial Court of Mas-
sachusetts validated Northeastern University's (NU) drug-testing pro-
gram based on Massachusetts' privacy and civil rights laws.
38. 865 P.2d 633 (Cal. 1994).
39. 863 P.2d 929 (Colo. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1646 (1994) [hereinafter
Derdeyn 111].
40. 856 F.2d 1375 (9th Cir. 1988) [hereinafter O'Halloran I'], rev'g on other
grounds, 679 F. Supp. 997 (W.D. Wash. 1988) [hereinafter O'Halloran III], rev'g, No. 87-
2-08775-1 (Wash. Super. Ct. July 23, 1987) (transcript of oral opinion) [hereinafter
O'Halloran I]. The litigation also includes one significant procedural holding: O'Halloran v.
University of Washington, 672 F. Supp. 1380 (W.D. Wash. 1987) [hereinafter O'Halloran
I] (denying University's injunction and plaintiff's motion to remand).
41. 532 N.E.2d 49 (Mass. 1989), rev'g, No. 87-1178 (Mass. Super. Ct Nov. 1987)
(Memorandum of Decision and Order) [hereinafter Bally Memorandum].
1994]
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Courts have taken a different approach when analyzing the drug
testing of high school student-athletes. In Schaill v. Tippecanoe County
School Corp.,42 the Seventh Circuit deferred to the judgment of the
high school district and upheld the random drug testing of high school
student-athletes.43
A. Legal Background to the Drug Testing Litigation
In Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives Association,44 the Su-
preme Court held that the monitoring, collection, and testing of urine
is a search45 that must comply with the Fourth Amendment. 46 Under
regulations promulgated by the Federal Railroad Administration, work-
ers were compelled to take drug and alcohol tests after major accidents
or when a supervisor had reasonable suspicion of drug and alcohol
use.47 The Supreme Court upheld the drug testing of federal railroad
workers.48 The Court held that the tests were reasonable searches un-
der the Fourth Amendment because the government established a com-
pelling need to drug test the employees-to protect the safety of rail-
way passengers from impaired employees. 49 In National Treasury Em-
42. 864 F.2d 1309 (7th Cir. 1988).
43. Id. at 1318.
44. 489 U.S. 602 (1989).
45. Id. at 617 ("[b]ecause it is clear that the collection and testing of urine intrudes
upon expectations of privacy that society has long recognized as reasonable, the Federal
Courts of Appeals have concluded unanimously, and we agree, that these intrusions must be
deemed searches under the Fourth Amendment'). The Supreme Court stated, "[tihere are few
activities in our society more personal or private than the passing of urine . . . . It is a
function traditionally performed without public observation; indeed, its performance in public
is generally prohibited by law as well as social custom." Id. (quoting Nat'l Treasury Em-
ployees Union v. Von Raab, 816 F.2d 170, 175 (5th Cir. 1987)).
46. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The Fourth Amendment guarantees "[t]he right of the
people to be secure in their persons . . . against unreasonable searches and seizures." Id.
The Fourth Amendment requires searches be conducted only after securing a properly issued
search warrant that was supported by probable cause. Id. The Fourth Amendment only ap-
plies to state actors.
47. 489 U.S. at 611. There is inconsistent language in Skinner as to whether the tests
required monitoring. At one point the Court stated that, "the process of collecting the sam-
ple ...may in some cases involve visual or aural monitoring of the act of urination." Id.
at 617. Yet the Court later stated "[t]he regulations do not require that samples be furnished
under the direct observation of a monitor." Id. at 626.
48. Id. at 634.
49. Id. at 620. The government's case was bolstered by evidence in the record of
12
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ployees Union v. Von Raab," a companion case to Skinner, the Court
upheld a portion of the United States Customs Office's program, al-
lowing the random testing of drug interdiction agents and firearm-car-
rying employees.5 The Court reasoned that the agency established a
compelling interest in protecting society from drug-impaired agents. 2
The Skinner Court concluded that drug tests not conducted in a
law enforcement context fit within the "special needs" exception to the
Fourth Amendment,53 thus the tests could be conducted without a
search warrant54 or probable cause.55 Consequently, the test for deter-
mining the constitutionality of a drug-testing program conducted by a
state actor has two prongs. First, the court must determine if the drug
test is reasonable based on the interests behind the testing, and second,
the court must ask if the test is reasonably tailored to fulfill the objec-
tives of the program. However, Fourth Amendment challenges to drug-
testing programs require the plaintiff to first prove that the sponsor of
the program is a state actor.5" A plaintiff who argues that the
substantial drug use by railroad employees and by evidence of nearly forty train accidents
that were caused by impaired or intoxicated employees. Id. at 607.
50. 489 U.S. 656 (1989).
51. Id. at 664-65.
52. Id.
53. The "special needs" exception allows searches that are backed by a substantial
government interest to take place without the formalities of the Fourth Amendment's warrant
clause.
54. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 621-25. The Court gave three reasons why the railroad
employees' drug tests fit into the "special needs" exception. First, the results of the drug
tests were not designed to be used in criminal prosecutions. Id. at 621 n.5. Second, the tests
were narrowly defined and were not administered at the discretion of government officials.
Id. at 621-24. Third, the drug tests would not catch drug users if the agency was required
to obtain a warrant before testing its employees. Id. at 623.
55. Id. at 624-25. Although warrantless searches were generally thought to require a
minimum of probable cause as the basis for the search, the Skinner Court held some search-
es could be conducted without any suspicion. Id. at 624. The Court stated that they had
"made it clear, f ], that a showing of individualized suspicion is not a constitutional floor,
below which a search must be presumed unreasonable." Id. (citing United States v. Marti-
nez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 560, (1976)). Justifying the random searches in Skinner, the Court
held that "[i]n limited circumstances ...a search may be reasonable despite the absence of
such [individualized] suspicion." Id. at 624.
56. See id. at 614-15 (stating that the Fourth Amendment does not apply to searches
conducted by private party).
1994]
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NCAA's program violates the Fourth Amendment must, therefore, first
establish that the NCAA is a state actor.5 7
In Barbay v. NCA,, 5" one of the first challenges to the NCAA's
program and its ineligibility sanctions failed because the court held that
the NCAA was not a state actor. After Roland Barbay, a football play-
er for Louisiana State University (LSU), was suspended for failing a
drug test, he sought an injunction against the NCAA to allow him to
participate in the 1987 Sugar Bowl.59 The basis of the claim was Sec-
tion 1983 of the Civil Rights Act.6" The court dismissed Barbay's
claim, holding that the NCAA was not a state actor, as required by
Section 1983.61 In ruling against Barbay, the court found that the reg-
ulation of college athletics was not a traditional state function,62 nor
was the NCAA directed by state actors.63
In the seminal case of NCAA v. Tarkanian," the Supreme Court
held the NCAA was not a state actor.65 University of Nevada-Las Ve-
gas (UNLV) Men's basketball coach, Jerry Tarkanian, claimed that the
NCAA breached due process of law when it ordered him suspended for
recruiting violations."' Since the NCAA was not a state actor,
57. See Kevin M. McKenna, A Proposition with a Powerful Punch: The Legality and
Constitutionality of NCAA Proposition 48, 26 DUQ. L. REv. 43, 53-59 (1988) (discussing
three theories for finding state action by NCAA). State action is also an essential element of
any challenge to a university-sponsored program.
58. No. 86-5697, 1987 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 393, at .1 (E.D. La. Jan. 20, 1987). For a
further discussion of this case, see Brock & McKenna, supra note 12, at 557-59.
59. Barbay, 1987 U.S. Dist. LEXIS at *1-6.
60. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988).
61. Barbay, 1987 U.S. Dist LEXIS 393, at *10-14. In order to find the NCAA was a
state actor, Barbay had to prove that: 1) the NCAA was'operating in an area traditionally
associated with the state; or 2) a state actor was essentially directing the NCAA's actions.
Id. at *12 (citing Arlosoroff v. NCAA, 746 F.2d 1019, 1021-22 (4th Cir. 1984)).
62. Id. at *12-13.
63. Id. Although LSU, a stipulated state actor, participated in the NCAA's rule-making
process, that alone did not prove it controlled the implementation of the NCAA's drug test-
ing program. Id. at *12-14.
64. 488 U.S. 179 (1988). For an in-depth discussion of state action and the NCAA,
see Kevin M. McKenna, The Tarkanian Decision: The State of College Athletics Is Every-
thing but State Action, 40 DEPAuL L. REv. 459 (1991).
65. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. at 182 n.5.
66. Id. at 187. After an NCAA report uncovered violations of NCAA recruiting rules
by UNLV, the NCAA placed UNLV on probation and requested it to show cause why the
[Vol. 97:53
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Tarkanian was not entitled to the protections of Fourth or Fourteenth
Amendment due process.67
The Supreme Court rejected Tarkanian's argument that the
NCAA's actions were "under color of law" because they resulted from
a delegation of power by its members, who were state actors, such as
UNLV.68 The Court reasoned that the NCAA "is more correctly char-
acterized as an agent of its remaining members which, as competitors
of UNLV, had an interest in the effective and evenhanded enforce-
ments of NCAA's recruitment standards." 69
While Tarkanian addressed the NCAA's role in enforcing sanctions
for recruiting violations,its holding that the NCAA is not a state actor
also applies to litigation concerning the NCAA's drug-testing program
because the factors for determining state action do not depend on the
Amendment that is used.70 As such, Tarkanian forecloses Fourth
NCAA should not impose additional sanctions on UNLV if it did not penalize or suspend
Tarkanian. Id. at 186. The suspension was recommended by the NCAA as a way for UNLV
to avoid sanctions, but the NCAA had no direct power to force UNLV's compliance. Id. at
197-98.
The Court rejected Tarkanian's assertion that "UNLV had no practical alternative"
but to comply with the NCAA. Id. at 198. The Court found that UNLV had several viable,
albeit "unpalatable," alternatives to membership in the NCAA. Id. at 198 n.19. But see id.
at 201 (White, J., dissenting) (arguing NCAA acted jointly with UNLV to suspend
Tarkanian); Hill v. NCAA, 273 Cal. Rptr. 402, 405 (Cal. Ct App. 1990) ('Itlhere is no
viable alternative to membership in the NCAA for a university with a major intercollegiate
sports program").
67. Id. at 191-92. The Court reiterated that the Fourth Amendment only applied to
state actors, stating, "[a]s a general matter the protections . . . do not extend to 'private
conduct abridging individual rights."' Id. at 191 (quoting Burton v. Wilmington Parking
Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 722 (1961)). The finding that the NCAA was not a state actor fore-
closed relief under Section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act, which provides recourse to those
deprived of constitutional rights by state actors. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988).
68. Id. at 195-96. NCAA legislation is proposed and approved by its members. Id. at
193. The Court stated that if all the NCAA's members were state actors, then it could find
that the NCAA was acting under "color of law," but, as such, some participation by state
actors did not transform the NCAA into a state actor. Id. at 194-95.
69. Id. at 196; see Barbay v. NCAA, No. 86-5697, 1987 U.S. Dist. LEXIS, at *11-15
(E.D. La. Jan. 20 1987). But see Tarkanian, 488 U.S. at 202 (White, J., dissenting). Justice
White disagreed with the five member majority, finding the NCAA directed UNLV's suspen-
sion of Coach Tarkanian, and therefore, was "jointly engaged" with UNLV which was a
state actor. Id.
70. But see John M. Evans, The NCAA Drug Program: Out of Bounds but Still in
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Amendment challenges to the NCAA's drug-testing program. Conse-
quently, plaintiffs challenging the NCAA's program must rely on state
laws.
Since there is no uniformity among the courts, it is essential to
identify the factors that influence courts in deciding challenges to drug
testing. There are three factors that affect the constitutionality of the
drug-testing program being challenged: 1) the protections of the various
state laws;7' 2) the sufficiency of the case record establishing a need
for drug testing; and 3) the testing program's procedures and methodol-
ogy.72
B. Hill v. NC.: The NCAA 's Drug-Testing Program Is
Constitutional (In California)
In Hill, Stanford University student-athletes challenged the
NCAA's drug-testing program. In 1987, the California Superior Court
issued a permanent injunction against the NCAA,73 barring it from
testing all Stanford athletes.74 In 1990, the California Court of Ap-
peals upheld the trial court's permanent injunction.7' In 1994, a ma-
jority of the Supreme Court of California reversed the Court of Ap-
peals and dissolved the permanent injunction restraining the NCAA
from drug testing.76
Play, 19 J.L. & EDUC. 161, 168 (1990) (distinguishing Tarkanian from potential drug testing
cases).
71. Compare University of Colorado v. Derdeyn, 863 P.2d 929, 946 (Colo. 1993)
(finding Colorado's right to privacy protected more rights than federal constitution) with
Bally v. Northeastern Univ., 532 N.E.2d 49, 52-53 (Mass. 1989) (holding Massachusetts'
privacy statute was narrow).
72. See Hill v. NCAA, 273 Cal. Rptr. 402, 414-16 (Ct App. 1990) [hereinafter Hill
DJ], rev'd, 865 P.2d 633 (Cal. 1994).
73. Hill v. NCAA, No. 619209, at 36 (Cal. Super. Ct. Nov. 19, 1987) [hereinafter
Hill 1]. Hill was a continuation of LeVant v. NCAA, No. 619209 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1987),
which was brought by Stanford diver Simone LeVant in early 1987. Hill 11, 273 Cal. Rptr.
at 406 n.4. The court granted a preliminary injunction in March 1987, on LeVant's behalf,
but it was terminated by stipulation upon LeVant's graduation. Id. Jennifer Hill and J. Barry
McKeever were added as plaintiffs in order to perpetuate the case. Id.
74. Hill I, No. 619209, at 36; Hill 11, 273 Cal. Rptr. at 407.
75. Id. at 404-05.
76. Hill II1, 865 P.2d 633, 699 (Cal. 1994).
[Vol. 97:53
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1. The Lower Courts Hold That the NCAA's Program Is
Unconstitutional
The Stanford athletes sued to prevent the enforcement of the
NCAA's drug-testing program." The plaintiffs claimed that the drug
tests invaded their privacy which was guaranteed by Article 1, Section
1 of the California Constitution." Stanford University intervened, join-
ing the lawsuit to protect itself from NCAA sanctions because it would
have been penalized for failing to administer the signing of the
NCAA's consent forms.79
The trial court issued a permanent injunction against the NCAA
because it concluded that the NCAA had neither established a compel-
ling need to drug test college athletes nor proved that its program was
narrowly tailored to meet its goals."0 According to the trial court, the
NCAA failed to establish a compelling need because it could not prove
that: 1) any of the drugs on its list enhanced athletic performance;
2), there was widespread use of any of the banned drugs by college
students; and 3) the NCAA program was designed to discover or deter
77. Id. at 637.
78. Id. The California Constitution's right to privacy clause states that "[a]ll people are
by nature free and independent and have inalienable rights. Among these are enjoying and
defending life and liberty, acquiring, possessing, and protecting property, and pursuing and
obtaining safety, happiness and privacy." CAL. CoNsT. art. 1, § 1.
79. Hill HI, 273 Cal. Rptr. at 406. For a further discussion of penalties on universities
for allowing ineligible athletes to compete, see supra note 4.
80. Hill I, No. 619209, at 2. The California Superior Court stated that while it would
be appropriate to test those employees that affected the public's safety, it was not appropri-
ate to test college athletes. Id. at 3; see Evans, supra note 70, at 164 ("[i]f those [NCAA]
objectives are legitimate, the facts must show widespread use of drugs among student ath-
letes, significant health and safety problems, and a program designed to deter the use of
performance-enhancing substances"). Showing disdain for drug testing, the court termed the
humiliation and embarrassment accompanying the act of urinating under the unwavering gaze
of one "whose entire attention is focused on the athletes [sic) normally private act of urina-
tion," an "offense against decency." Hill I, No. 619209, at 6.
81. Hill I, No. 619209, at 8. In fact, the NCAA agreed that none of the banned drugs
enhanced performance. Instead it argued that athletes did not believe this fact and continued
to use the drugs. Id. at 4. This argument succeeded before the Supreme Court of California.
Hill III, 865 P.2d at 660.
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use of the banned substances.82 The trial court concluded that the
NCAA's list of banned drugs was overbroad because it covered harm-
less substances and its vague term "related compounds" unduly broad-
ened the list of substances. 3
The California Court of Appeals affirmed the decision by holding
that the trial court had not abused its discretion in issuing the injunc-
tion.84 The court agreed with the trial court's finding that the NCAA
had not demonstrated a "compelling need" to drug test Stanford ath-
letes and it agreed with the finding that the NCAA's tests were an
unreasonable invasion of the plaintiffs' privacy.8" The appeals court
82. Hill I, No. 619209, at 8.
83. Id. at 33-35. The California Superior Court faulted the NCAA for including com-
mon stimulants on its list of banned substances, stating:
With the exception of caffeine . . . there was no showing whatever in this case of
the relevance of this drug list to anything. The most obvious example is
'strychnine' which so far as the Court knows is primarily used to poison
rats ....
All of the testimony concerning diuretics was speculative. Not one witness
offered any evidence based on reasonable medical probability, the standard, for
banning it.
Id. at 33-34.
The court also identified numerous methodological problems with the NCAA's tests,
finding that the tests revealed false positives, disclosed a lack of quantitative results as to
the amount of the drug and the time it was taken, and depended on probabilities, not cer-
tainties. Id. at 16-24.
84. Hill 11, 273 Cal. Rptr. at 423. The Hill I court concluded that the NCAA's pro-
gram violated the Fourth Amendment. Hill 1, No. 619209, at 2. Due to the intervening
decision in Tarkanian v. NCAA, 488 U.S. 179 (1988), the Fourth Amendment ruling was
not before the appeals court. The Fourth Amendment verdict would have been overturned
because the NCAA was not a state actor. For a discussion of Tarkanian, see supra notes
64-70 and accompanying text.
85. Hill I, 273 Cal. Rptr. at 422. The appeals court framed the NCAA's burden of
proof on appeal, stating:
Mhe NCAA must demonstrate that: (1) the testing program relates to the purposes
of the NCAA regulations which confer the benefit (participation in intercollegiate
competition); (2) the utility of imposing the program manifestly outweighs any
resulting impairment of the constitutional right and (3) there are no less offensive
alternatives.
Id at 410. This is a compelling interest test.
As to the "availability of less intrusive alternatives," the Hill 1H court concluded that
drug education was both viable and under-utilized by the NCAA. Id. at 421. The court also
stated that the use of suspicion-based testing should have been explored by the NCAA. Id.
18
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determined that the tests invaded the plaintiffs' privacy by: 1) subject-
ing them to the embarrassing act of monitored urination; 2) interfering
with the confidentiality of their medical records; 3) interfering with
medical treatment; and 4) imposing surveillance on their activities.86
The court found that these privacy interests were substantial and could
only be outweighed by a compelling interest, which the NCAA had not
established.
2. The Supreme Court of California Reverses
In 1994, the Supreme Court of California reversed the California
Court of Appeals. 7 The court held that the NCAA's legitimate inter-
ests in drug testing college athletes outweighed the tests' invasion on
the athletes' diminished expectation of privacy.8" It is settled law that
drug testing is an invasion of privacy; 9 the question addressed in Hill
was whether it was too substantial an invasion to be permissible under
California's Constitution. The court first analyzed .whether the Califor-
nia Constitution's right of privacy extended to invasions by private
actors.9" The court then analyzed the nature of the right to privacy,
engaging in a lengthy historical analysis before concluding that there
are several types of privacy and several different standards that can be
used to analyze an alleged privacy invasion.9 ' The court next set forth
elements necessary to establish an invasion of privacy cause of ac-
tion. The court concluded by' applying the standards and elements of
an invasion of privacy cause of action to the NCAA's drug-testing
program.93
In light of increased funding by the NCAA for drug education, the court might reach a
different finding on the availability of less intrusive alternatives.
86. Id. at 416.
87. Hill III, 865 P.2d 633 (Cal. 1994).
88. Id. at 658-60.
89. See Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 617 n.4 (1989).
For a further discussion of urinalysis as a search, see supra note 45 and accompanying text.
90. Hill III, 865 P.2d at 641-44.
91. Id. at 644-54.
92. Id. at 654-55.
93. Id. at 657-67.
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Each court in the Hill litigation agreed that the protections of the
California Constitution's right to privacy clause extends to the actions
of private, nongovernmental actors.9" The Supreme Court of California
determined that the legislative history of the Privacy Initiative (Initia-
tive),9' the Ballot Arguments, supported the conclusion that the Initia-
tive governed private actors as well as governmental entities.96 The
court found that the Initiative was designed to protect the public from
the "overbroad collection and retention of unnecessary personal infor-
mation by government and business interests."97
The court next determined that the proper standard to use in Hill
was an intermediate standard: the invasion of privacy could be justified
by a showing of legitimate interests. The lower courts in Hill applied a
test that required the NCAA to demonstrate a compelling interest for
testing the Stanford athletes and to prove there were no available alter-
native procedures that were less invasive than the NCAA's program. It
was first necessary for the Hill III court to determine what type of
right privacy is: fundamental or legitimate. Although there was lan-
guage in the Initiative stating that privacy was a "fundamental and
compelling interest" and in the Ballot Arguments that an invasion
could only be justified by establishing a "compelling public need," the
court held that the Initiative created a right of privacy that can be
outweighed by a showing of legitimate interests. To support its conclu-
sion, the court examined the history of the right to privacy and found
that it created a right that was narrower than other fundamental
rights.98 The court then stated that there are two types of privacy
94. Hill 111, 865 P.2d at 644; Hill 11, 273 Cal. Rptr. at 408. The California Court of
Appeals stated: "[p]rivacy is protected not merely against state action; it is considered an
inalienable right which may not be violated by anyone." Id. (quoting Porten v. University of
San Francisco, 134 Cal. Rptr. 839, 842 (Ct. App. 1976)). Thus, the protections of the Cali-
fornia Constitution apply to organizations, like the NCAA, which are immune under the
Fourth Amendment.
95. The Privacy Initiative was the legislative campaign to add the privacy clause to
the California Constitution. Hill 111, 865 P.2d at 641.
96. Id All of the Justices on the court agreed on this point. Id. at 669 (Kennard, J.,
concurring & dissenting); Id. at 672 (George, J., concurring & dissenting); Id. at 679 (Mosk,
J., dissenting).
97. Id. at 642 (quoting White v. Davis, 533 P.2d 222, 240 (Cal. 1975)). The court la-
belled this invasion of privacy an invasion of "informational privacy." Id. at 650.
98. Id. at 646-50. The court found that the common law created a right of privacy
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rights: the right to protect private information and the right to autono-
my 9 According to the court, another factor mitigating against impos-
ing a compelling interest standard on the NCAA was that the NCAA
as a private actor should not be held to the same standard as govern-
mental actors."' Before applying the legitimate interests standard to
the Hill case, the court first set forth the elements of an invasion of
privacy cause of action.
The court stated there are three elements to an invasion of privacy
cause of action brought under the California Constitution: (1) the
plaintiff must establish that the invasion is of "a legally protected pri-
vacy interest";" 1 (2) the plaintiff must prove a "reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy," the reasonableness of which is determined by analyz-
ing the circumstances; and (3) the plaintiff must establish that the inva-
sion of privacy is serious."0 2 The court stated that any such invasion
can be overcome by a showing of a compelling or legitimate inter-
est."03 However, a plaintiff may then attempt to establish the exis-
tence of feasible alternatives to overcome any legitimate interest de-
fense. 10 4
The court then applied its new test to the NCAA's drug-testing
program. The court found that the plaintiffs satisfied the first element:
the NCAA invaded both autonomy privacy, by monitoring urination,
and informational privacy by disclosing confidential information.'
Analyzing the second element, the court concluded that the Stanford
athletes' expectation of privacy was diminished because: athletes are
closely regulated; athletes are frequently examined; athletes disrobe in
that was limited in its scope. Id. at 648. The court also looked to conventional wisdom re-
garding the nature of the federal constitutional right and correctly recognized that the federal
right of privacy is less than fundamental. Id. at 651.
99. Id. at 654. The court stated that California case law did not establish a compelling
interest test for all invasions of privacy as was asserted by the plaintiffs. Id.
100. Id. at 641. Dissenting Justice Mosk sharply criticized this assertion. Id. at 701
(Mosk, J., dissenting).
101. The court used the first prong to differentiate between informational privacy and
autonomy privacy.
102. Id. at 657.
103. Id.
104. Id. The lower courts applied a least intrusive alternative standard.
105. Id. at 657-58.
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public;10 6 and athletes expect the testing by virtue of the consent
forms.' 7 Concluding that the Stanford athletes had a diminished ex-
pectation of privacy, the court then determined that the NCAA's inter-
ests were legitimate and outweighed the tests' invasive nature. The
court's finding that the NCAA's interests in "protecting the health and
safety of student-athletes" and promoting fair competition were legiti-
mate conflicted with the trial and appellate courts' findings. Although
the lower courts were using a compelling interest standard, some of the
uncontroverted findings mitigate against finding that the NCAA had a
legitimate interest to drug test. For instance, both lower courts deter-
mined that none of the NCAA's banned substances actually enhanced
athletic performance and thus drug use did not threaten fair competi-
tion."8 The Supreme Court of California agreed that there was scant
evidence of enhancement, but then stated that athletes believed that
drugs enhanced performance, and therefore, used drugs. 9 Thus, the
court found that the NCAA could justify preventing drug use.
The court also found that the NCAA's interest in protecting the
athletes' health and safety was significant and supported by evidence
adduced at trial."' Where the lower courts found there was no evi-
dence that drug use by athletes placed them in increased danger during
competition,"' the Supreme Court of California disagreed."' Both
106. Id. at 658 n.13 (citing Schaill v. Tippecanoe County School Corp., 864 F.2d 1309
(7th Cir. 1988)). In dissent, Justice Mosk questioned how changing in a locker room dimin-
ishes the invasiveness of monitored urination. Id. at 692 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
107. Id. at 658. In footnote 12, the majority analogizes monitored urination to urination
in a male restroom where there are no partitions between urinals. Id. at 658 n.12 (quoting
Dimeo v. Griffin, 943 F.2d 679, 682 (7th Cir. 1990)). There is a fundamental difference
between urinating in a public restroom and compulsory monitored urination: men have a
choice to use an enclosed stall or wait until the restroom is empty. Student-athletes have no
choice.
108. Hill I, 273 Cal. Rptr. at 418-20; Hill I, No. 619209, slip op. at 8. At best, the
evidence proffered by the NCAA established that only amphetamines could affect perfor-
mance. Hill , 273 Cal. Rptr. at 419. In fact, the appeals court asserted that some of the
banned substances actually hindered athletic performance. Id.
109. Hill 11I, 865 P.2d at 660 ("whatever the provable incidence of drug use, percep-
tion may be more potent than reality"). The court found that the NCAA has an interest in
upholding its reputation. Id. at 661. Thus the NCAA could take steps to ensure that the
competition was perceived as fair and drug free. Id.
I10. Id
111. Hill I, 273 Cal. Rptr. at 418; Hill I, No. 619209, at 10.
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lower courts stated that there was only minimal evidence adduced at
trial that athletes used drugs more than other college students during
the athletic season other than anabolic steroids and a few street
drugs.' The Supreme Court of California found this evidence was
irrelevant because college athletes "have set themselves apart . . . they
have different and diminished expectations of privacy.".. 4 The lower
courts both concluded that the NCAA's tests were overbroad and
flawed."5 As to this finding, the Supreme Court of California held
that the Initiative did not permit an in-depth review of the programs of
private actors, therefore, the overbreadth argument was erroneous."6
The court concluded its analysis by finding that there were no
feasible alternatives to monitoring, therefore, the Stanford athletes could
not overcome the NCAA's legitimate interests." 7 The court did not
address the appeals court's finding that the injunction was not a viola-
tion of the Interstate Commerce Clause because the injunction only
incidentally affected interstate commerce.' Because the NCAA could
not impose testing on Stanford athletes, many schools felt Stanford
112. Hill I, 865 P.2d at 662.
113. Hill 11, 273 Cal. Rptr. at 413; Hill I, No. 619209, at 10.
114. Hill IIl, 865 P.2d at 662. The court stated that although drug use was not ram-
pant, if unchecked, drug use could increase and substantially harm competition and athletes'
health. Id. The court thus enunciated a preventive theory behind testing, although the evi-
dence did not appear to establish an underlying need for testing.
115. Hill 11, 273 Cal. Rptr. at 412, 414-15; Hill 1, No. 619209, at 33-35. As the ap-
peals court explained, the list of banned drugs was 58 pages long, and the use of common
beverages such as coffee and tea had to be declared before testing. Hill 11, 273 Cal. Rptr.
at 412. The appeals court also agreed with the trial court's finding that the NCAA's tests
were flawed in their procedure. Id at 414-15. Besides identifyihg problems with chain of
custody and laboratory handling, the court stated that a positive test for steroids was based
on estimated probabilities unsupported by independent confirmation. Id. The court also sin-
gled out the testing for metabolites as inadequate, finding that, "[e]ven poppy seed can cause
a positive for opiates under the NCAA drug testing program." Id. at 415.
116. Hill III, 865 P.2d at 663.
117. Id. at 664. The court implied that there were feasible alternatives, but the plaintiffs
had not proved this. Id. at 665. However, the court would not remand.
118. Hill 11, 273 Cal. Rptr. at 422-23. The NCAA claimed that banning it from testing
Stanford athletes at post-season competitions would limit its ability to sponsor post-season
championships. Id. at 422. The NCAA feared that other schools would protest or boycott
championships based on Stanford's perceived competitive edge.
1994]
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athletes received special treatment and enjoyed a competitive advantage.
However, the court never reached this finding.
Hill produced three other opinions: Justice Kennard concurred in
the analysis, but dissented in the result; Justice George concurred in
part and dissented in part; and Justice Mosk dissented. Justice Kennard
agreed with the majority's premise that private actors are held to a
lesser standard than governmental actors and that the NCAA had those
legitimate interests."' Justice Kennard believed, however, that the ma-
jority should have remanded the case to give the Stanford athletes an
opportunity to litigate under the new legal standard announced by the
court.
120
Justice George, unlike Justice Kennard, dissented with regard to
the majority's analysis, but concurred in the result.'12  Justice George
relied on precedent to support the conclusion that the proper standard
was the compelling interest standard.'22 According to Justice George,
the majority misread White v. Davis" and ignored the plain language
of the Initiative and the Ballot Arguments. Justice George also dissent-
ed from the majority's application of a lesser standard to private enti-
ties, such as the NCAA. 124 Believing that the factors of advance no-
tice and consent reduced the invasiveness of the tests and that the
NCAA had compelling interests to drug test, Justice George found that
the NCAA's tests were constitutional. 25
119. Hill 111 865 P.2d at 670 (Kennard, J., concurring & dissenting). Justice Kennard
stated that the plaintiff's expectation of privacy cannot be determined by custom or practice
within the industry. Id at 671 (Kennard, J., concurring & dissenting).
120. Id. at 671-72 (Kennard J., concurring & dissenting).
121. Id at 672 (George, J., concurring in result).
122. Justice George stated the Initiative was clear in establishing the fundamental nature
of the right of privacy. Id. at 673-74 (George, J., concurring in result).
123. 13 Cal. 3d 757 (1975).
124. Hill III, 865 P.2d at 673 (George, J., concurring in result). Justice George rea-
soned that the effect of an invasion of privacy by a private actor was the same as an inva-
sion of privacy by a governmental organization. Id.
125. Id. at 678-79 (George, J., concurring in result). Justice George agreed that the
athletes had a diminished expectation of privacy and the NCAA had an interest in prevent-
ing unfair competition and protecting competitors during competition. Justice George stated
that the NCAA did not need to have evidence of drug use before it began testing. Justice
George analogized drug testing to the search by boxing officials of a boxers' gloves or
trunks. Id. The example of a search during boxing is flawed because searches were only
[Vol. 97:53
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Justice Mosk sharply dissented, finding that the proper standard
was a compelling interest standard. Mosk quoted the Ballot Arguments,
which declared that, "the right of privacy is the right to be left alone.
It is a fundamental and compelling interest."'26 Justice Mosk, like
Justice George, did not see any basis for applying a lesser standard to
private actors.' Justice Mosk then applied the trial court's findings
to rebut the majority's analysis.' Specifically, Justice Mosk stated
that the trial court's finding that there was no evidence of drug use by
athletes clearly established there was no need for the NCAA's pro-
gram.'29 Justice Mosk also stated that there were feasible alternatives
to monitoring.
3. Discussion of the Supreme Court of California's Opinions
The Supreme Court of California decision is not persuasive. First,
it appeared to impose a legal standard with no basis in precedent or in
the legislative history of the Initiative. The court made factual findings
"de novo" that were contrary to the findings of the lower courts, with-
out substantial evidential support.
In Hill I, the California Court of Appeals held that compelling
interest was the standard used to analyze invasion of privacy causes of
action. The Supreme Court of California erroneously attempted to dis-
tinguish the cases that applied the compelling interest standard.
Although none of these cases arose in the same precise factual context
as Hill, each case held a compelling interest standard applicable in the
invasion of privacy context.
In White v. Davis,3 a university professor challenged police sur-
veillance and information gathering techniques.'' The plaintiff sought
implemented to combat a pre-existing problem, unlike the NCAA's drug tests.
126. Id. at 680 (Mosk, J., dissenting). Quoting heavily from the ballot arguments, Jus-
tice Mosk concluded that the right of privacy is, indeed, fundamental. Id. at 682 (Mosk, J.,
dissenting).
127. Id. at 687 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. 13 Cal. 3d 757 (1975) (en banc).
131. Id. at 761-62.
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relief, alleging a violation of both free speech and California's right of
privacy." The Supreme Court of California held that the police tac-
tics were an invasion of privacy that could only be justified by a com-
pelling governmental interest.'33 The Hill III court distinguished White
on several grounds: first, the privacy language in White was dicta; and
second, the compelling interest standard used in White was imposed on
a government actor.'34 However, the privacy claim in White is an al-
ternative ground for relief, not dicta as the Hill III court claimed. Also,
the White court never distinguished between government and private
actors; in fact, it quoted language from the Ballot Arguments that im-
plicated both government and private organizations. 3 '
Based on its interpretation of White, the court stated that "[s]ome
of our decisions following White use "compelling interest" language;
others appear to rely on balancing tests." Yet the cases the court relied
on cited White with approval and generally adhered to a compelling
interest standard.'36 The California Court of Appeals had consistently
applied White's compelling interest test to a variety of cases involving
different types of privacy invasions. 37 The Hill III court, while not
132. Id at 760.
133. Id. at 775. The court interpreted the Ballot Arguments as clearly establishing that:
"the amendment does not purport to prohibit all incursion into individual privacy but rather
that any such intervention must be justified by a compelling interest." Id. (emphasis added).
134. Id. at 774-75.
135. White, 13 Cal. 3d at 775. The court quoted the Ballot Arguments: "The right of
privacy . . . protects [citizens] from government and business interests." Id. at 774.
136. Hill 111, 865 P.2d at 653 n.11. For instance in People v. Stritzinger, the Supreme
Court of California stated that the right of privacy yields only to a "compelling state inter-
est." 668 P.2d 738 (Cal. 1983). The Stritzinger court appears to use a balancing test as the
Hill court suggested, but its statement "[d]efendant [does not] argue [ ] that the state's inter-
est in protecting children is less than compelling" suggests that the "balancing test" was to
be between compelling interests and privacy rights. Id. at 741-43. In Loder v. Municipal
Court for the San Diego Judicial District of San Diego County, the Supreme Court again
appears to adopt a balancing test, but quotes White and states that the defendants asserted a
compelling interest. 17 Cal. 3d 859, 864 (1976) (quoting White, 13 Cal. 3d. at 775).
Doyle v. State Bar of California cites White with approval, then states that a privacy
interest can "be 'outweighed by the public interest." 184 Cal. Rptr. 720, 724 (1982).
However, the Doyle court does not elaborate as to which standard is the correct standard.
Interestingly, the majority cites Doyle to support its position and Justice Mosk cites Doyle to
support his position. Hill 111, 865 P.2d at 653 n.11; Id. at 683 n.27 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
137. See American G.I. Forum v. Miller, 267 Cal. Rptr. 371, 373 (Ct. App. 1990)
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bound by the appeals court cases, is disingenuous in attempting to
distinguish cases without squarely addressing these decisions on their
face appearing to set forth a blanket compelling interest test, including
White. 13'
Moreover, the Initiative clearly states, as the majority
acknowledges, that the right of privacy is "fundamental."' 39 The
statement in the Ballot Arguments that the right of privacy cannot be
abridged unless there is a "compelling public need" is equally unam-
biguous. While the use of the Ballot Arguments is imperfect, as the
majority stated in footnote 5, it is the only legislative history available.
The majority's criticism of the use of the Ballot Arguments conflicts
with its decision in White where the Supreme Court stated that the
Ballot Arguments were the Initiative's only legislative history and that
the use of the Ballot Arguments was necessary to determine the legis-
lative intent behind the Initiative. The Hill III court is, therefore, being
disingenuous when indicating that the use of the Ballot Arguments is
not helpful because it used them in White for its finding that private
actors must comply with the privacy clause.
("intervention into privacy must be justified by a compelling interest"); Luck v. Southern
Pac. Transp. Co., 267 Cal. Rptr. 618, 629 (Ct. App. 1990) ("[w]e see no reason to depart
from existing precedent applying the compelling interest test in cases arising under"
California's privacy clause); Alarcon v. Murphy, 248 Cal. Rptr. 26, 29 (Ct. App. 1988)
(stating that any invasion of privacy "must be justified by a compelling interest"). Alarcon
arose in the context of the disclosure of a suspect's arrest Id. at 28. See People v. Wil-
liams, 180 Cal. Rptr. 734, 737 (Ct App. 1982). In Williams, the court differentiated be-
tween the search and seizure standard of reasonableness and the standard for invasions of
privacy which is a "compelling interest' standard. The plaintiff in Williams was surreptitious-
ly taped in the back of a police car and alleged an invasion of his privacy. The court
found the plaintiff had no reasonable expectation of privacy while under arrest in the back
of a police car. Id. at 738. See also Santa Barbara v. Adamson, 164 Cal. Rptr. 539, 543
(1980). The Supreme Court of California quoted White and required Santa Barbara to show
vit had a compelling interest in passing an ordinance requiring residents in the same home
to be related. Id. at 541-42.
138. The California Court of Appeals believed that White established a compelling inter-
est standard in all privacy cases. Luck v. Southern Pac. Transp. Co., 267 Cal. Rptr. 618,
629 (Ct. App. 1990) ("[w]e see no reason to depart from existing precedent applying the
compelling interest test in cases arising under" California's privacy clause). Accord In re
Noah M., 260 Cal. Rptr. 309, 313 (Ct App. 1989) (citing White with approval).
139. Hill IN, 865 P.2d at 644.
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Although the federal right of privacy is likely governed by a rea-
sonableness standard and is not a fundamental right, it has no bearing
on Hill III because the California right of privacy is stronger than the
federal right. In Committee to Defend Reproductive Rights v.
Myers,4 ' the Supreme Court of California reasoned that the Califor-
nia right of privacy is not identical to any federal constitutional right
of privacy.' In fact, the Myers court stated that the California right
of privacy is broader than any federal right of privacy."42 Therefore,
in light of the cases decided by the California Court of Appeals, the
Initiative's equivocal legislative history, and the strength of the Califor-
nia right of privacy, the proper standard should be a compelling inter-
est standard. The Hill III court should have announced that it was
formulating a new standard and remanded the case to the trial court.
Further, the Supreme Court did not justify its essential de novo review
of the trial court's findings, some of which appear to be at least par-
tially factual in nature.'
Hill III has significant repercussions for the NCAA and for Cali-
fornia plaintiffs who sue for invasion of privacy. The NCAA can now
drug test student athletes in every state. This eliminates a perceived
advantage that Stanford athletes had as a result of the lower courts'
140. 172 Cal. Rptr. 866 (1981).
141. Myers, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 871.
142. Id. (quoting Santa Barbara v. Adamson; 164 Cal. Rptr. 539, 543 n.3 (1980)).
143. Questions of ultimate fact - i.e. mixed questions of fact and law, may, under
certain circumstances, appropriately be decided under a de novo appellate standard. See
Schwarzer, Summary Judgment Under the Federal Rules: Defining Genuine Issues of Mate-
rial Fact, 99 F.R.D. 464, 489-493 (1984). However, "pure" questions of fact are generally
reviewed under a clearly erroneous appellate standard, as are "ultimate fact" questions in
some circumstances. Cf id. at 489-492. As discussed in Part I11I.C. below, in University of
Colorado v. Derdeyn, 863 P.2d 929 (Colo. 1993), a majority of the Colorado Supreme
Court, in contrast to the California Supreme Court, largely deferred to the trial court's find-
ings concerning the invasiveness of the University of Colorado's drug-testing program, and
the reasonableness of the invasion.
The issue of the appropriate standard of appellate deference to trial court conclusions
concerning the invasiveness, unreasonableness and permissibility of drug testing programs is
discussed further infra in Part IV.A.5, concerning lessons from drug testing litigation.
[Vol. 97:53
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injunction.'" Commentators hailed the decision as a significant re-
striction on the right of privacy in California.
C. Derdeyn: Colorado Rejects Random Drug Testing
In University of Colorado v. Derdeyn,141 the Supreme Court of
Colorado addressed two issues that were briefly addressed by the Hill
III majority: whether athletes have a diminished expectation of privacy
and the voluntariness of the consent to be drug tested. The second
issue was the core of the dispute in Colorado.
In 1993, the Supreme Court of Colorado, in Derdeyn, held that the
University of Colorado's (CU's) drug-testing program was an unreason-
able search under the Fourth Amendment.'46 Because the court treated
the issue as a question of fact, the trial court's fmdings were accorded
great weight. Therefore, the trial court's opinion must first be analyzed
in order to understand the Supreme Court of Colorado's holding.
1. Background
In 1986, CU student-athletes brought a class action challenging
CU's drug-testing program.4 The plaintiffs alleged that CU's pro-
gram was an unconstitutional search under both the Fourth Amendment
and the Colorado Constitution's right to privacy clause.
Although CU modified its program several times during the course
of the litigation, every aspect of the program was before the Supreme
Court of Colorado because CU reserved the right to return to its origi-
nal program.'48 CU's program had some of the same features as the
NCAA's program: all student-athletes were required to sign a consent
form agreeing to be tested before they could participate in athletics; a
positive drug test resulted in varying levels of punishment depending
144. Erin McCormick, Court Approves NCAA's Drug -Tests, S.F. EXAMiNER, Jan. 29,
1994, at Al.
145. 863 P.2d 929 (Colo. 1993) [hereinafter Derdeyn II1].
146. Id.
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on the number of previous positive tests; and student-athletes were
tested for proscribed drugs.149 During one incarnation of CU's pro-
gram, visual monitoring was required. 5
There were several differences, however, between CU's program
and the NCAA's program. The CU consent form released the test re-
sults to a number of CU officials without a guarantee of confidenti-
ality.' Although student-athletes were originally selected at random,
in the program's third incarnation student-athletes were selected using
objective criteria that were supposed to detect drug use. Under this
program, CU student-athletes could only be tested if they failed a Rap-
id Eye Examination (REE) or if university officials had a reasonable
suspicion of drug use.'52
In August, 1989, the Colorado District Court in Boulder County
ruled that CU's drug-testing program violated both the Fourth Amend-
ment"'53 and -the Colorado Constitution.'54 The court found that CU
149. Id. at 930-33. Presumably CU's list mirrored the NCAA's list. However, in the
modification of the program, CU added alcohol and over-the-counter drugs to its list.
150. Id. at 932.
151. Id. at 930-33. In CU's final program, it provided a limited guarantee of confiden-
tiality. Id at 932. Among the officials who received a student-athlete's test results were
coaches, trainers and work supervisors. Id. at 930-33. Parents were also notified of test
results. Id.
152. Both the Rapid Eye Exam and the suspicion-based test were harshly criticized by
the courts. The Rapid Eye Exam was characterized as being devoid of any helpful chamc-
teristics that aided in the detection of drug use. Among the factors that were used to pro-
vide a reasonable suspicion of drug use were: "tardiness, absenteeism, poor hea[l]th habits,
emotional swings, unexplained performance changes, and/or excessive aggressiveness." Id. at
932.
153. Derdeyn I, No. 86-CV-22453-3, at 13 (Colo. Dist. Ct. Aug. 22, 1989). CU was a
stipulated state actor, thus the. courts applied the Fourth Amendment via the Fourteenth
Amendment to analyze the constitutionality of CU's drug-testing program. See Derdeyn III,
863 P.2d at 930 n.1; Derdeyn 1, 832 P.2d 1031, 1033 (Colo. Ct. App. 1991).
154. The claims brought under the Colorado Constitution were resolved by the court's
Fourth Amendment holding. Derdeyn I, No. 86-CV-22453-3, at 12. The court stated that the
privacy clause of the Colorado Constitution guaranteed more extensive protections of privacy
than the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 8. Therefore, a finding of unconstitutionality under the
Fourth Amendment would equate to unconstitutionality under the Colorado Constitution. Id.
The right to privacy clause in the Colorado Constitution reads:
The people shall be secure in their persons, papers, homes and effects, from unrea-
sonable searches and seizures; and no warrant to search any place or seize any
person or things shall issue without describing the place to be searched, or the
30
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did not establish a compelling need for its program, therefore, it was
an unreasonable search under the Fourth Amendment.'55 The court
held that CU's interests in preserving its image and ensuring the integ-
rity of athletics were not sufficiently important to validate the urinaly-
sis under the Fourth Amendment.'56 The drug tests merely protected
the sanctity of athletics; they did not affect the public's general wel-
fare."5 7 The trial court also found that CU's objective of protecting
the athletes' safety was not a compelling interest because there was no
evidence of drug use by CU's student-athletes. 5 '
The court held that the inefficiency of the REE test rendered drug
testing based on a REE failure an unreasonable search.'59 The court
also found that CU failed to carry its burden of proof in establishing
that the consent forms were voluntarily signed by student-athletes.16 °
Such a showing would overcome an unreasonableness finding.' The
person or thing to be seized, as near as may be, nor without probable cause, sup-
ported by oath or affirmation reduced to writing.
CoLo. CONST. arL II, § 7.
155. Derdeyn I, No. 86-CV-22453-3, at 7 n.2. The trial court stated that the Supreme
Court's holdings in Skinner and Von Raab required that CU show a compelling interest to
support its program. Id.
156. Id. at 4, 6-7.
157. Id. at 6. The trial court reasoned:
[lt is only athletic games we are concerned with here. There are no issues of
"public safety" or "national security." There is no evidence of special substantial
drug abuse which distinguishes this population from any other in our society. The
integrity of athletic contests cannot be purchased at the cost of privacy interests
protected by the Fourth Amendment. There is simply no compelling interest sug-
gested by the University ....
Id. Extrapolating this reasoning, the court concluded that if student-athletes could be ran-
domly tested, then so too could other segments of society. Id.
158. Id. at 4.
159. Id. at 7. The court criticized the efficacy of the REE, stating "[a]s a factual mat-
ter the REE is totally ineffective. It is an intrusion without purpose. It does not reveal what
it is intended to reveal. It is wholly unable to indicate with any measure of validity whether
a person has been using any of the proscribed drugs." Id. CU did not challenge the court's
finding on the efficacy of the REE search at the appellate level. See Derdeyn 1H, 832 P.2d
at 1033.
160. Derdeyn I, No. 86-CV-22453-3, at 11.
161. It is settled law that a search which is not otherwise constitutional is permitted if
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trial court relied on the "unconstitutional conditions" doctrine, which
states that consent conditioned on receiving a benefit or a right is pre-
sumed to be involuntary."' The court stated:
Though a person has no "right" to a valuable governmental benefit and
even though the government may deny him the benefit for any number of
reasons, there are some reasons upon which the government may not rely.
It may not deny a benefit to a person on a basis that infringes his consti-
tutionally protected interest .... For if the government could deny a
benefit to a person because of his [exercise of] constitutionally protected
[rights], his exercise of those freedoms would in effect be penalized and
inhibited. This would allow the government to produce a result which it
could not command directly.""
Thus, the court concluded that CU coerced athletes to sign the consent
forms because participation in intercollegiate athletics, the governmental
benefit at stake, was conditioned on signing the consent form.'64
In 1991, the Colorado Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's
holding, but reversed the injunction to the extent that it prohibited
drug-testing that was based on reasonable suspicion.6 The Colorado
Court of Appeals determined that the trial court's finding that CU had
not satisfied its burden of proving that the consent form was voluntari-
ly signed was not clearly erroneous.'66 The appeals court concluded
that CU's student-athletes were coerced into signing the consent forms
because a failure to sign would cause the student-athletes to lose valu-
able economic benefits, such as athletic scholarships.'67
162. Derdeyn 1, No. 86-CV-2243-3, at 11.
163. Id. at II (quoting Perry v. Sinderman [sic], 408 U.S. 583, 597 (1972)).
164. Id.
165. Derdeyn 11, 832 P.2d at 1035-36. The appeals court reversed the portion of the
injunction that prohibited all searches not based on probable cause. Id. at 1035. The court
stated that reasonable suspicion sufficed under circumstances where there is a significant
need for drug testing. Id. The court stated that CU failed to prove that its tests were based
on reasonable suspicion or that it had a "compelling need based on actual student drug
related problems" to justify drug testing. The court found that under different circumstances
CU could prove a "compelling need" or prove that testing was based on reasonable suspi-
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In 1993, a 4-3 majority of the Supreme Court of Colorado af-
firmed the Colorado Court of Appeals.'68 The court held that CU's
program constituted an unreasonable search under both the Fourth
Amendment and the Colorado Constitution, and the trial court correctly
found that the consent for testing was not voluntarily given.'69
The court explained that the reasonableness of CU's program was
not a question of fact, but resembled a question of fact.'70 The court
thus gave substantial weight to the trial court's findings.'" The court
then balanced the student-athlete's privacy interests and CU's interests
in testing its student-athletes. CU argued that the student-athletes had a
diminished expectation of privacy, therefore, CU's program was not
intrusive.' The court rejected the argument that student-athletes are
subjected to regular medical examinations, which diminishes their ex-
pectations of privacy, because CU's drug tests were not done in a
regular medical environment. The court rejected CU's argument
that student-athletes were extensively regulated and, therefore, expected
drug testing because there was no evidence that the student-athletes
were, in fact, extensively regulated.'74 CU argued that because usual
monitoring was not performed, the program was less intrusive. Howev-
er, the court determined that CU could have returned to visual moni-
toring at any time it chose, thus CU's argument was irrelevant. The
court also rejected the argument that the loss of participation in inter-
168. Derdeyn 111, 863 P.2d at 930.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 938. In dissent, Justice Erickson stated that the reasonableness issue is a
question of law that must be reviewed de novo. Id. at 959 (Erickson, J., dissenting). Al-
though the majority accorded the trial court substantial weight, it engaged in searching anal-
ysis and did not wholly adopt the trial court's findings.
171. Id. at 938.
172. Cf Hill v. NCAA, 865 P.2d 633, 658 (Cal. 1994) (finding NCAA athletes had
"diminished expectation of privacy" because they were extensively regulated).
173. Derdeyn II1, 863 P.2d at 940. The Skinner Court stated that tests conducted in a
medical environment are less intrusive than other drug tests. Skinner v. Railway Labor Exec-
utives Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 626-27 (1989). Testimony by CU student-athletes established
that the urine samples were not taken in a medical environment. Derdeyn 11, 863 P.2d at
940. The court found that CU's drug-testing program negatively affected student-athletes'
relationships with CU's athletic trainers. Idl at 941 n.25. CU student-athletes stated that they
no longer trusted the trainers because the trainers were seen as prosecutorial agents. Id.
174. Id. at 941.
19941
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collegiate athletics was not a severe penalty because the court found
that such a loss of eligibility was significant, although less severe than
a loss of employment or liberty. 75
The court then found that the interests asserted by CU to justify
drug testing its student-athletes were not significant interests. CU's
interests were: (1) preparing its athletes for drug testing in NCAA
championship events; (2) promoting the integrity of its athletic pro-
gram; (3) preventing drug use by other students who look to athletes
as role models; (4) ensuring fair competition; and (5) protecting the
health and safety of intercollegiate athletics. 76 The court stated that
CU must justify testing by showing that public safety or national secu-
rity was threatened, as was suggested by Skinner.1' The court charac-
terized the interests of preserving the integrity of CU's athletic pro-
gram and of fair athletic competition as "not very significant for
Fourth Amendment purposes. "178
The Supreme Court of Colorado also found that the trial court had
not erred when it held that CU had not established that its student-
athletes had voluntarily consented to the drug testing. The court deter-
mined that voluntariness of consent was a question of fact that could
not be reviewed de novo unless the factual findings were clearly erro-
neous. 179 CU argued that the trial court had not made a factual find-
ing on the issue of voluntariness, but had instead applied the legal
doctrine of "unconstitutional conditions" and determined that the con-
sent was involuntary. The court concluded that the trial court used the
"unconstitutional conditions" doctrine only as an alternative ground.
Thus, the trial court's decision based on factual findings must be ac-
175. Id. at 942. The court stated that the loss of eligibility was significant because it
deprived some student-athletes of the opportunity for a professional sports career, it deprived
many of the experience necessary to become a coach, and deprived student-athletes of their
scholarships. Id.
176. Id. at 943.
177. Id. at 945. The court stated that the role model interest might be a significant
interest but CU did not introduce evidence that CU's athletes were role models. Id. at 945
n.30.
178. Id. at 945.
179. Id. at 9,16-47 (citing Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 24849 (1973)).
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cepted unless the findings were clearly erroneous. 8 Finally, the court
also rejected the argument that the factual finding that consent was
involuntarily obtained had to be determined on an individual basis
because the case was a class action.'
Two Justices dissented in Derdeyn I. Chief Justice Rovira dis-
sented, stating that the trial court's holding on the issue of voluntary
consent was based solely and erroneously on the "unconstitutional con-
ditions" doctrine.' Chief Justice Rovira relied on the fact that the
trial court heard no evidence from prospective student-athletes on the
voluntariness issue; thus, the trial court had to state that as a matter of
law no CU student-athlete could ever voluntarily consent to be drug
tested.183 Chief Justice Rovira then analyzed whether the doctrine was
properly applied to CU's student-athletes and decided it was not. 8
Chief Justice Rovira's dissent ignored the fact that CU had the burden
to prove voluntariness, therefore, any inferences must be resolved in
favor of the student athletes.
Justice Erickson also dissented, finding that the drug testing was
reasonable and agreeing with Chief Justice Rovira that the trial court
erred on the issue of voluntary consent. Justice, Erickson stated that
suspicionless drug testing is valid in certain contexts, especially when
the privacy interests at stake are de minimis. Justice Erickson conclud-
ed that not only were CU's interests in conducting its drug-testing pro
gram valid,' but that student-athletes had a diminished expectation
of privacy.'86 Justice Erickson concurred with Chief Justice Rovira's
180. Id. at 947.
181. Id. at 949.
182. Id. at 951 (Rovira, C.J., dissenting).
183. Id. Such a ruling would be reviewed de novo argued Chief Justice Rovira.
184. Id. at 952-56 (Rovira, C.J., dissenting).
185. Id. at 960 (Erickson, J., dissenting). Justice Erickson argued that protecting the
health and safety of athletes was a valid interest but he did not address the fact that CU
never adduced evidence of drug use at CU. Justice Erickson also relied on the role model
theory as justification, but relied on a case involving high school students. See Schaill v.
Tippecanoe County Sch. Corp., 864 F.2d 1309, 1318 (7th Cir. 1988).
186. Derdeyn 111, 863 P.2d at 961. Justice Erickson cited three reasons why CU's stu-
dent-athletes had a diminished expectation of privacy: (1) student athletes are subject to
regular and routine physical examinations; (2) student athletes voluntarily submit to extensive
regulation of their personal behavior, and (3) a communal locker room atmosphere is com-
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dissent with regards to the voluntariness of consent. The two dissenters
rejected the use of the "unconstitutional conditions" doctrine to estab-
lish that consent to be drug tested when conditioned on participation in
intercollegiate athletics is never voluntary. Both dissenters found that
the governmental benefit of participation in intercollegiate athletics was
too insignificant to trigger the application of the doctrine.
2. Discussion
The Colorado Supreme Court majority in Derdeyn III deferred
substantially to the trial court's findings on the interests that were
implicated by CU's drug-testing program. CU made several crucial
errors in the conduct of its drug-testing program and the subsequent
litigation that invalidated its program. CU's determined stance to re-
serve the right to return to the original program crippled its efforts
during the litigation because the most invasive aspects of the past pro-
gram were before the court. Two aspects of its various programs -
visual monitoring and lack of confidentiality for the test results -
greatly intruded on the athletes' privacy. CU also failed to build a
record at trial that would justify its program. Without evidence of a
need to drug test its student-athletes, CU could not justify its program.
CU's other rnistake was to use the REE test, which is a flawed indica-
tor of drug use, to justify its reasonable suspicion tests.
The major flaw in the Derdeyn III court's analysis is its finding
that the "unconstitutional conditions" doctrine can be asserted when the
governmental benefit is participation in intercollegiate athletics. The
doctrine was developed in the context of welfare, which the Supreme
Court has long recognized as an important governmental benefit. Al-
though the doctrine has been extended to benefits considered less im-
portant than welfare, none are comparable to participation in competi-
monplace in intercollegiate athletics. Id Justice Erickson stated that the three reasons did not
extend beyond student-athletes because no other identifiable group shared the three compo-
nents. Justice Erickson also relied on two eases that are inapposite for his communal locker
room argument. Schaill dealt with high school athletes and the Seventh Circuit did not find
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tive amateur athletics. Thus the court may have extended the doctrine
beyond its boundaries.
Although decided in a state court, Derdeyn III relies on the Fourth
Amendment and could thus be used as persuasive support in other
courts. However, CU's program is largely anomalous because few drug
testing programs include as many invasive components as CU's pro-
gram. It is important to note, in addition, that the NCAA was not a
party to the litigation in Derdeyn. The NCAA can continue to test CU
athletes who qualify for post-season competition. The permanent in-
junction only prohibits CU from utilizing random drug testing.
D. O'Halloran: The Three-Headed Procedural Monster
The O'Halloran litigation involved a challenge to the University of
Washington's (UW's) drug-testing program and encompassed four opin-
ions in three courts, a final disposition on a procedural matter and a
settlement accompanied by a dismissal. At times the NCAA was a
defendant, but the case ultimately centered only on UW's program.
Although UW's drug-testing program was upheld in O'Halloran IN,
that opinion is not controlling because it was reversed on procedural
grounds. The litigation illustrates differing approaches to drug-testing,
as the federal district court's holding in O'Halloran III was a sharp
repudiation of the state court's decision in O'Halloran L The two
decisions differed in their views of the consent form's coercive nature
and of the reasonableness of the drug-testing program.
1. The O'Halloran Decisions
In 1987, Elizabeth O'Halloran, a cross-country runner for UW,
sued to enjoin UW's drug-testing program.117 The UW program was
modelled after the NCAA's program and had three important features.
First, the UW program had a secure chain of custody.' Second,
187. O'Halloran v. University of Washington, 856 F.2d 1375, 1377 (9th Cir. 1988)
[hereinafter O'Halloran IV].
188. O'Halloran v. University of Washington, No. 87-2-08775-1, at 4 (Wash. Ct. App.
1987) [hereinafter O'Halloran 1]. The lower courts in Hill were troubled by the NCAA's
chain of custody procedures. Hill II, 273 Cal. Rptr. at 414.
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there was no problem with disclosing confidential information, such as
test results, to a number of people.189 Finally, UW monitored its ath-
letes while they urinated. 190
In O'Halloran I, the Washington Superior Court granted a prelimi-
nary injunction prohibiting the enforcement of the random testing por-
tion of UW's program.' 9 The program was held to violate both the
Fourth Amendment and the Washington Constitution. 92 The court re-
lied on three factors to invalidate UW's program: 1) monitoring was an
invasion of privacy;'93 2) UW introduced no evidence of drug use at
UW to support the need for its program;94 and 3) UW had not es-
tablished that the consent to be tested was given voluntarily.' 95 The
NCAA was not a party in O'Halloran I, but the oral ruling, on its
face, purported to apply to the NCAA's program.' 96
After the trial court's invalidation of both the UW's and the
NCAA's programs, the students, UW and the NCAA began a three-
sided procedural dance.' 97 In O'Halloran 11,98 the United States
189. O'Halloran I, No. 87-2-08775-1, at 6.
190. Id. at 4-5.
191. Id. at 20. For a detailed discussion of the oral opinion, see Brock & McKenna,
supra note 12, at 548-51.
192. Id. Washington's state constitution explicitly guarantees the right to privacy. WASH.
CONST. art. , § 7. The section provides that, "[n]o person shall be disturbed in his private
affairs, or his home invaded without authority of law." Id. For a comparison to the right to
privacy in the California Constitution, see supra note 78.
193. O'Halloran I, No. 87-2-08775-1, at 9-10.
194. Id. at 10-11.
195. Id. at 17.
196. Id. at 20-21. The court concluded:
It is clear that the NCAA's requirement of all athletes consenting in writing to
random post season drug testing as a condition of the University's right to partici-
pate in post season championships and bowl events suffers from even more consti-
tutional deficiencies than does the University of Washington's proposed program,
which is more structured and much more limited.
Id.
197. The state court advised O'Halloran to join the NCAA as a defendant and it ad-
vised UW to seek an injunction preventing the NCAA from sanctioning it for failing to
comply with the NCAA's program. O'Halloran IV, 856 F.2d at 1377.
198. O'Halloran v. University of Washington, 672 F. Supp. 1380 (W.D. Wash. 1987)
[hereinafter O'Halloran II]. The NCAA removed the case to federal court after it was joined
as a third-party defendant by UW. Id. at 1381.
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District Court for the Western District of Washington denied UW's
motion for a preliminary injunction against the NCAA, holding that the
need for an injunction was not established because the NCAA had not
been heard on the constitutionality of its program. 9 ' In a separate
part of the opinion, the court denied O'Halloran's motion to remand
the case to Washington state court, stating the court had federal sub-
ject-matter jurisdiction."'
In O'Halloran III,201 with the NCAA's program at issue, the dis-
trict court finally addressed O'Halloran's claim that the NCAA's drug-
testing program was unconstitutional. The court rejected the state
court's analysis in O'Halloran I and denied O'Halloran's motion for an
injunction against the NCAA 2" The court held that the NCAA was
not a state actor as required by Section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act
and the Fourth Amendment. Therefore, O'Halloran could not maintain
her suit against the NCAA. °3 The court, nevertheless, proceeded to
analyze the NCAA's program under the Fourth Amendment." 4 In
dicta, the court applied a balancing test and determined that the
NCAA's important interests in drug testing student-athletes outweighed
O'Halloran's singular and unimportant interest in competing on the in-
tercollegiate level."5
The court applied the test developed in New Jersey v. T.L.O.206
to determine the reasonableness of the NCAA's program under the
Fourth Amendment.20 7 The T.L.O. test has two prongs: 1) whether the
199. Id.
200. Id. The court found there was both a federal question and diversity of citizenship
between UW and the NCAA. Id. at 1382. According to the court, the case involved the
Fourth Amendment because UW would have to prove that the NCAA's program was uncon-
stitutional. Id. at 1383.
201. O'Halloran v. University of Washington, 679 F. Supp. 997 (W.D. Wash. 1988)
[hereinafter O'Halloran III]. The court dismissed the third-party complaint against the NCAA
and ordered the plaintiffs to join the NCAA as a defendant. Id. at 998. Meanwhile, UW
dropped its random testing plan and was dismissed as a defendant. Id.
202. Id. at 999-1000.
203. Id. at 1000.
204. Id. at 1001-05.
205. Id. at 999-1000.
206. 469 U.S. 325 (1985).
207. Id. at 341. In T.L.O., the Supreme Court held that a high school official's search
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search was justified at its inception; and 2) whether the search as con-
ducted was reasonably related to the circumstances that justified the
initial interference. °8 In O'Halloran III the district court concluded
that the NCAA had sufficient reasons to justify its drug testing2' 9 and
that the testing was sufficiently limited so as to justify the minor intru-
sions on O'Halloran's privacy.210
The court rejected O'Halloran's arguments that the NCAA's con-
sent form was coercive and that the conduct and scope of the tests
were overly invasive. The court found that the NCAA's consent form
was not coercive because the only consequence of refusing to sign was
the denial of intercollegiate eligibility, not the denial of participation in
all athletics.2" ' The court also found that the tests' intrusive aspects,
such as monitored urination and disclosure of irrelevant, private infor-
mation, were not sufficiently invasive to outweigh the NCAA's "com-
pelling" interests."' The court implicitly relied on the diminished ex-
of a student's purse without probable cause was permissible under the Fourth Amendment.
Id. at 341-42. The Court found that schoolchildren had a lesser privacy interest, therefore,
the search did not require either a warrant or probable cause. Id. at 340.
208. Id. at 341. The T.L.O. Court stated that it was not deciding "whether individual-
ized suspicion is an essential element of the reasonableness standard," noting that "although
'some quantum of individualized suspicion is usually a prerequisite to a constitutional search
or seizure .... the Fourth Amendment imposes no irreducible requirement of such suspi-
cion."' Id. at 34.2 n.8 (quoting United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 560-61
(1976))., The Court noted that "[e]xceptions to the requirement of individualized suspicion
are generally appropriate only where the privacy interests implicated by the search are mini-
mal" and when the testing officials have limited discretion. Id. at 342.
209. O'Halloran III, 679 F. Supp. at 1004. The court stated that the NCAA had ample
evidence of drug use, but the court relied only on media accounts of athletes' drug use and
on the testimony of a single expert. Id. By comparison, the O'Halloran I court had noted
that there was an "absence of evidence of a significant drug problem among athletes in
general, or athletes at the University of Washington." O'Halloran I, No. 87-2-08775-1, at
12.
210. O'Halloran II, 679 F. Supp. at 1005. The court resolved this issue by deferring to
the findings of the NCAA's experts on the reasonableness of the test's procedures. Id. at
1005-06.
211. Id. at 1000, 1005. The court stated that the denial of the right to participate in
intercollegiate athletics resulting from a refusal to consent was not a constitutionally protect-
ed right. Id at 1005. Unlike the Colorado Supreme Court in Derdeyn III, the O'Halloran
III court did not read the "unconstitutional conditions" doctrine to include rights not found
in the Constitution.
212. O'Halloan III, 679 F. Supp. at 1005-06. The court found that as an athlete,
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pectation of privacy argument in the context of athletics to uphold the
NCAA's program.213
O'Halloran III's impact, however, has been negated by two subse-
quent events. In O'Halloran 1V, the Ninth Circuit reversed O'Halloran
III on procedural grounds and remanded the case to the state
courts.214 .The Ninth Circuit held that O'Halloran's amended com-
plaint which added the NCAA as a defendant did not create federal
jurisdiction because the complaint was filed pursuant to the district
court's order.2"5 Finally, the O'Halloran IV court concluded, contrary
to the lower court's assertion, that UW's claim against the NCAA was
a state law breach of contract claim.
216
The O'Halloran litigation ended in June, 1989, when O'Halloran
and UW settled and agreed to dismiss O'Halloran's suit."7 Their
agreement set forth a non-exhaustive list of four grounds on which
future challenges to UW's program could be predicated and allowed
O'Halloran to proceed in her suit against the NCAA.218
O'Halloran was accustomed to communal undressing, thus the monitoring of her urination
was neither uncommon nor overly invasive. Id at 1005. The court also reasoned that report-
ing safeguards would protect O'Halloran from improper disclosures of test results. Id.
213. The O'Halloran 11I court concluded that "the larger interests of the health of the
student-athlete . . . greatly outweighs [sic] the relatively small compromise of an individual's
privacy interest, which is diminished in the context of collegiate athletics." Id. at 1007.
214. O'Halloran IV, 856 F.2d at 1381. The court held that the denial of the motion to
remand was a reversible error. Id
215. Id. at 1379-80. The Ninth Circuit held that, "when a court orders the plaintiff to
amend its complaint, doing so does not moot the question [as argued by the NCAA] wheth-
er removal to the federal court was proper." Id. at 1380. The court added that the NCAA
did not have diversity jurisdiction, because it was an unincorporated association. Id. at 1381.
In addition, the court held that O'Halloran specifiqally reserved her right to appeal the deni-
al of her motion to remand. Id. at 1379.
216. Id. at 1380-81. The court recharacterized the action, stating UW joined the NCAA
as a third-party defendant to protect itself from sanctions for a future breach of contract
with the NCAA. Id. The court disagreed with the O'Halloran II court's reasoning, stating
UW would not have to allege that the NCAA's program violated the Fourth Amendment, in
order to gain an injunction against the NCAA. Id.
217. O'Halloran v. University of Washington, No. 87-2-08775-1, at 1 (Wash. Super. Ct.
June 26, 1989) (Stipulation and Order of Dismissal). Pursuant to the settlement agreement,
UW eliminated its random drug testing, leaving tests based on reasonable suspicion of drug
use in place. O'Halloran and University of Washington Partial Settlement Agreement, at 1-2
(1989).
218. O'Halloran and University of Washington Partial Settlement Agreement, at 1-2
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2. Making Sense of the Disorder(s)
Due to the settlement and the numerous actions, motions, dismiss-
als and appeals, O'Halloran established no rule of law. In fact, because
the Ninth Circuit reversed O'Halloran III on jurisdictional grounds, the
O'Halloran III ruling that the NCAA's tests were valid was never
addressed by the appeals court. Thus, the reasoning on the merits in
the O'Halloran decision is significant only for its effect on UW's
drug-testing program and for the persuasive impact of the O'Halloran
III reasoning. However, the persuasive impact of the O'Halloran III
opinion is found solely in its dicta.
In analyzing the tests' reasonableness, the O'Halloran III court
relied on three dubious propositions. First, the court stated that the
"element of communal undress" in athletics diminished the invasiveness
of monitored urination." 9 Second, the court found that anecdotal evi-
dence of drug use in the past by some members of a class, proved that
drug testing will "turn up evidence of... drug use" by members of
the class.22 Third, the court determined that the NCAA narrowly tai-
lored its test to achieve its objective of deterrence.
The O'Halloran III court used the same logic as the Hill III court
that the element of communal undressing and showering in athletics
reduced the invasiveness of monitored urination.22 There is one falla-
cy with this argument: it equates voluntary undressing in the presence
of teammates with compulsory, monitored urination conducted for the
purposes of investigation and possible subsequent sanctions. As the
Skinner Court stated, the act of urination is private;222 monitored uri-
nation with use of the results in this manner is not rendered less inva-
sive because an athlete has, in the past, undressed in front of
teammates.
(1989).
219. O'Halloran III, 679 F. Supp. at 1005.
220. Id at 1004.
221. See Hill III, 865 P.2d at 657.
222. See Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 617 (1989) (quot-
ing National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 816 F.2d 170, 175 (5th Cir. 1987)).
[Vol. 97:53
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The need for the UW and the NCAA's drug-testing programs was
meagerly supported by anecdotal evidence of past incidents of drug use
by athletes. The O'Halloran court erred in relying on that evidence for
three reasons. First, reliance on anecdotal evidence of drug use as a
legal finding that drug use exists at UW is questionable. Second, the
court did not address the specificity of evidence necessary to justify
drug testing at UW; there was no evidence of a drug problem at UW.
Third, anecdotal evidence of past drug use by some athletes does not
logically lead to the conclusion that other athletes use drugs.
The O'Halloran III court also inadequately addressed whether the
NCAA's drug-testing program was overbroad and thus not tailored to
satisfy its objectives.2" The court deferred solely to the judgment of
the NCAA's experts on the reasonableness of the tests.224 The dicta
in O'Halloran I is important because it demonstrates that: 1) some
courts may be unwilling to expand the "unconstitutional conditions"
doctrine to the context of college athletics; 2) courts can find that the
privacy interests of college athletes are minimal, even in the context of
monitored urination; and 3) the NCAA's interests may be found to be
compelling.
E. Bally v. Northeastern: An Indirect Victory for the NCAA
Bally v. Northeastern University" involved a challenge to North-
eastern University's (NU's) drug-testing program. In Bally, the Massa-
chusetts Supreme Judicial Court upheld NU's drug-testing program
because the student-athlete could not prove that NU coerced his con-
sent to be drug tested.
223. See Hill II, 273 Cal. Rptr. at 418.
224. O'Halloran 11I, 679 F. Supp. at 1005. The court incorrectly asserted that the
NCAA tests would not disclose any irrelevant private information. Id. This flat assertion is
contradicted by the bulk of medical testimony. See Derdeyn 1, 832 P.2d at 1033 ("[ilt is
not disputed . . . that chemical analysis of urine, like that of blood can reveal a host of
private medical facts about an employee, including whether she is epileptic, pregnant, or
diabetic").
225. 532 N.E.2d 49 (Mass. 1989).
1994]
43
Brock et al.: Drug Testing College Athletes: NCAA Does Thy Cup Runneth Over
Published by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1994
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 97:53
1. Facts, Holding, and Reasoning
In 1987, David Bally, a distance runner for NU, sued under
Massachusetts' Civil Rights Act22 6 and Right of Privacy Act 27 to
enjoin NU's drug-testing program. NU's program featured monitored
urination, consent forms, a list of banned substances that mirrored the
NCAA's list, random testing and a limited distribution of test re-
sults.228 However, Bally would center on the issue of the consent
form. Deciding the case on stipulated facts, the Massachusetts Superior
Court granted summary judgment in Bally's favor. In 1987, the Massa-
chusetts Superior Court held that NU's program violated the Massachu-
setts Civil Rights Act because 1) the consent provision was a coercive
deprivation of Bally's right to privacy; 2) the drug testing was
overbroad in that it disclosed private information which was irrelevant
to the program's purposes; and 3) there was no need for NU's pro-
gram because there was no evidence of drug use by NU student-ath-
226. The Massachusetts Civil Rights Act required Bally to prove that his constitutional
rights guaranteed by state or federal law were interfered with and that the interference was
accomplished by the use of "threats, intimidation or coercion." See MASS. GEN. L. ch. 12, §
1 lH-I (1988). The Massachusetts Constitution secures the right to privacy in Article 14.
Thus, NU's alleged interference was with Bally's privacy rights under the explicit right to
privacy in Massachusetts and also by implication under the Fourth Amendment's protection
against unreasonable searches and seizures. Bally, 532 N.E.2d at 52; see MASS. CONST. art.
14, § 1; U.S. CoNsT. amend. IV. The Massachusetts Civil Rights Act, like Section 1983 of
the Federal Civil Rights Act, requires state action. The Massachusetts Civil Rights Act, how-
ever, differs from the Federal Civil Rights Act by adding the requirement that the depriva-
tion of rights be caused by the "use of threats, intimidation or coercion." Compare Mass,
Gen. L., ch. 12, § I lH-I (1988) with 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988).
227. The Massachusetts Right of Privacy Act provides that, "[a] person shall have a
right against unreasonable, substantial or serious interference with his privacy." MASS. GEIN.
L. ch. 214, § 1B (1986).
228. Bally Memorandum, No. 87-1178, at I (Mass. Super. Ct. Nov. 1987) [hereinafter
Bally Memorandum]. NU's program prohibited the use of any of the NCAA's banned sub-
stances. Bally, 532 N.E.2d at 50-51. It further provided for: a compulsory annual drug test;
permissive, random testing throughout the year; and mandatory testing of all athletes who
were to compete in NCAA post season competitions. Id. In fact, NU only tested those ath-
letes who participated in post season NCAA championships. Id. When Bally refused to sign
either the NCAA's or NU's consent form, he was declared athletically ineligible. Id. at 51.
As a result, Bally brought suit to enjoin the enforcement of NU's program. Id.
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letes.229 The trial court stated that NU could not condition Bally's
athletic eligibility on a waiver of his constitutional rights."' The
court also found that NU violated Bally's right to privacy because the
drug tests disclosed non-pertinent and confidential information.23" ' Like
the Hill I court, the Bally trial court found that the lack of evidence of
drug use at NU established that there was no need for the invasive
tests. 2
The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court reversed, holding that
Bally failed to prove a violation of either the civil rights or the priva-
cy acts. 33 According to the court, Bally did not establish that NU
violated his civil rights for two reasons. First, the court found that
there was no evidence of NU's use of "threats, intimidation or coer-
cion." 4 As to the coercion the trial court found to exist in the sign-
ing of consent forms, the Supreme Judicial Court held that Bally, by
virtue of his refusal to sign the form,235 was merely excluded from
229. Bally Memorandum, at 16-17, 21-22.
230. Id. at 16-17. The court agreed that Bally had no right to participate in athletics,
but found that the consent provision was still coercive for the statute's purposes. Id. at 17.
The court implicitly relied on the "unconstitutional conditions" doctrine.
231. Id. at 21. This finding was based on Bally's rights-of the type the authors term
"confidentiality type 1," which includes the right to freedom from disclosure of personal
information irrelevant to a program's articulated goals. Drug tests necessarily reveal infor-
mation unrelated to a search for drugs such as pregnancy, illnesses, or the type and use of
birth control medication. Id.
232. Id. at 24. The Batiy trial court found that there were less intrusive alternatives
than random testing. Id. The court stated that the search was unreasonable, "particularly
where the less intrusive means of coach training, athlete education and observation may be
employed toward protecting NU's interests." Id. The parties stipulated that "chronic or sub-
stantial abuse of certain drugs by athletes may be detectable" by means less intrusive than
drug testing. Id. at 13-14.
233. Bally, 532 N.E.2d at 50.
234. Id. at 52.
235. As the O'Halloran litigation demonstrates, signing the NCAA's or the university's
consent forms before seeking injunctive relief may be the only realistic way for a student-
athlete to maintain eligibility while challenging the programs. Unlike the plaintiffs in Hill,
O'Halloran and Bally, Derdeyn signed'CU's consent form before challenging its program.
The status of both O'Halloran and Bally-ineligible because they refused to sign the NCAA
consent form-illustrates the prejudice a student-athlete may suffer by refusing to sign the
NCAA's consent form. Thus, signatures on consent forms should be viewed as reservations
of eligibility pending resolution of legal challenges, rather than as waivers of a legal right
to challenge the constitutionality of the programs.
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participation in intercollegiate sports. 6 Second, the court stressed that
the Massachusetts Civil Rights Act was narrowly drawn and did not
address the type of violation alleged by Bally.2" The court distin-
guished other civil rights cases finding that NU's program was uni-
formly applied, therefore, it was not "comparable with the direct as-
sault" directed towards "a particular individual or class of persons."238
The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court overturned the summary
judgment on the privacy claim, interpreting the privacy statute to re-
quire a showing of public disclosure of private or confidential infor-
mation.239 The court found that NU had not disclosed any private in-
formation.24 In its ruling, the court distinguished several Massachu-
setts cases that concerned drug testing in the employment context.24
The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court decided Bally in con-
junction with Horsemen's Benevolent and Protective Association v.
State Racing Commission.242 In Horsemen's, the court held that the
drug testing of jockeys by the state's horse racing commission violated
the explicit right of privacy found in the Massachusetts Constitu-
236. Id. at 53.
237. Id. at 52-53. The court asserted that the Act was only intended to address the
problems created by racial discrimination and was not intended to create a "vast constitu-
tional tort." Id. at 52 (quoting Bell v. Mazza, 474 N.E.2d 1111, 1115 (Mass. 1985)).
238. Id. at 52-53.
239. Id. at 53.
240. Id. The court did not address whether disclosure of results of a positive drug test
to relevant university officials could constitute public disclosure under the privacy statute.
241. Bally, 532 N.E.2d at 53-54. The Bally court distinguished Cort v. Bristol-Myers
Co., 431 N.E.2d 908 (Mass. 1982), where the Supreme Judicial Court held that within the
context of private employment an employee could not "be discharged for refusing to answer
unreasonably intrusive inquiries of a personal nature." Id. (quoting Cort, 431 N.E.2d at 912
n.9 (Mass. 1982)).
The court also distinguished Bratt v. International Business Machs. Corp., 467
N.E.2d 126 (Mass. 1984), again finding that the disclosure of highly personal information
was limited to the context of private employment and disclosures by employers. Id. (citing
Bratt, 467 N.E.2d at 133-34). The Bally court stated that disclosure of private information
in an intra-corporate memo was an invasion of privacy, but only when applied to the con-
text of private employment Id. The court did not view the Bally case as stemming from a
contract; therefore, it did not address whether an athlete who was bound by a scholarship
contract could raise the disclosure issue.
242. 532 N.E.2d 644 (Mass. 1989).
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tion.243 Since the commission was a state actor, the court applied the
protections of the Massachusetts Constitution to the commission's drug-
testing program.244
The Horsemen's court analysis was comprised of two relevant
parts. First, the court disagreed with the premise that extensive regula-
tion of an industry justified invasive searches.245 Second, the court
found that the preservation of fair competition was not a compelling
interest,246 and there was no evidence of a health threat to justify the
need for the program.247 The primary difference between Bally and
Horsemen's was that the Horsemen's court applied the greater privacy
rights guaranteed by the Massachusetts Constitution because the racing
commission was a state actor.24
2.. Discussion
The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court's analysis in Bally is
deficient in two areas: 1) it failed to address Bally's argument that the
243. Id. at 646.
244. Id. Because there was no state action in Bally, the plaintiff could not invoke the
protections of privacy guaranteed in the Massachusetts Constitution. Id at 646 n.1.
245. Horsemen's, 532 N.E.2d at 650-51. The court criticized the reasoning that a dimin-
ished expectation of privacy is concomitant with employment in a heavily regulated industry,
stating that there was a host of industries that would a priori be subject to drug testing. Id.
at 650 n.3. The Horsemen's court firmly "reject[ed] the argument that random drug testing
in an industry can be justified solely by, or hinges on, the extent to which that industry is
heavily regulated." Id. at 650. But see Shoemaker v. Handel, 795 F.2d 1136, 1142 (3d. Cir.
1986) (stating jockeys were employed in heavily regulated industry which diminished their
privacy).
246. The court reasoned that random testing was only designed to prevent "catastrophic
losses," therefore, the commission's stated purpose of "prevent[ing] improperly won or lost
horse races" failed to justify its program. Horsemen's, 532 N.E.2d at 651-52. But see Shoe-
maker, 795 F.2d at 1142. The Shoemaker court held that the preservation of fair competition
was a compelling interest. 795 F.2d at 1142. Ironically, the purpose behind the New Jersey
testing program was the same as the Massachusetts program-preserving the integrity of horse
racing. Compare Shoemaker, 795 F.2d at 1138 with Horsemen's, 532 N.E.2d at 646.
247. Although there was circumstantial evidence of drug abuse at Suffolk's Downs race
track, the court asserted that this evidence was not sufficient to justify the drug testing.
Horsemen's, 532 N.E.2d at 646.
248. See Horsemen's, 532 N.E.2d at 646, n.1, 648 (citing Mass. Declaration of Rights,
Art 14).
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consent forms were coercive; and 2) it did not address the test's dis-
closure of private information. The court dismissed the argument that
the student-atlhletes' signing of NU's consent form was coerced, and
therefore, it found that Bally could not prove a violation of the Act.
The court interpreted coercion as requiring a threat of physical harm;
thus, Bally's contention that the consent was a form of economic coer-
cion was viewed as inapposite.249 The court thus rejected participation
in intercollegiate athletics as sufficient to implicate the "unconstitutional
conditions" doctrine. This holding directly conflicts with the holding of
the Colorado Supreme Court in Derdeyn III
Interpreting the Massachusetts Right of Privacy Act to cover only
the public disclosure of private facts, the Bally court then
mischaracterized Bally's claim, stating that his complaint addressed the
prospective disclosure of the test results. Bally was actually attacking
the overbreadth of the testing. Thus, the court did not explain why in
Horsemen's it found that the drug testing was overbroad because it
disclosed non-pertinent facts,"0 but in Bally it concluded that such
disclosures did not rise to the level of a disclosure of confidential
information under the privacy statute. Whereas the Hill III court held
that the California Constitution's privacy clause covered the actions of
private actors,2" the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court would not
similarly extend the Massachusetts Constitution. 2
The Bally court reversed the judgment against NU because Bally
could not establish that he was coerced into signing the consent
form.2" Thus, the. Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court placed the
burden of proof on Bally, whereas the Colorado Supreme Court in
Derdeyn III placed the burden of proof on the university to prove
voluntariness. The fundamental difference in these cases is a disagree-
249. Bally, 532 N.E.2d at 53-54.
250. Horsemen's, 532 N.E.2d at 649.
251. Hill 11I, 865 P.2d at 643-44.
252. See Horsemen's, 532 N.E.2d at 646 n.1. If the Massachusetts Constitution covered
NU's program, the court would have been compelled to apply Horsemen's to invalidate
NU's program. Horsemen's and Bally shared three similarities: 1) there was not sufficient
evidence of drug use in either program to justify the drug tests; 2) both programs featured
monitoring; and 3) both programs invariably disclosed irrelevant, private information,
253. Bally, 532 N.E.2d at 50.
[Vol. 97:53
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ment over the extent of the "unconstitutional conditions" doctrine and
the importance of participation in intercollegiate athletics.
Bally is significant for its treatment of an intercollegiate drug
testing program under restrictive state privacy statutes. Again, the
NCAA was not impacted by the Bally litigation.
F. Recent Developments: Continuing Litigation
The NCAA has not enjoyed a respite from challenges to its testing
program. However, recent challenges have been individual appeals of
sanctions for positive drug tests. Program wide challenges have been
averted by settlements with the challenging athletes. In October 1991,
Steve Premock, a football player for the University of Montana, ob-
tained an injunction against the NCAA allowing him to resume playing
football after he tested positive for steroids. 4 Citing flaws in the
NCAA's methodology and its chain of custody, Montana District Court
Judge Douglas Harkin rejected the NCAA's appeal and granted
Premock an injunction to resume playing.2 55 In December, 1991, the
NCAA settled with Premock thereby averting further litigation.256
In 1992, Monty Grow, a football player for the University of Flor-
ida, initiated a suit against the NCAA to regain a lost year of eligibili-
ty after he was suspended for failing a test for steroids."' Grow
eventually regained his lost year of eligibility, thereby avoiding litiga-
tion with the NCAA and the University of Florida."' Grow claimed
there were problems in the NCAA's testing procedure that constituted a
violation of his right to due process." Grow's attorney attributed set-
tlement to the NCAA's fear of litigation that would have challenged
the constitutionality of the NCAA's program under Florida's privacy
254. Judge Hits NCAA Drug Testing, CHICAGO TRaB., Oct. 13, 1991, at C3.
255. Id. Judge Harkin stated the "NCAA has a long way to go before this court can
accept the results of their drug-testing program." Id.
256. NCAA to Pay Athlete in Drug-Case Settlement, USA TODAY, Dec. 13, 1991, at
Cll.
257. Peter Kerasotis, FBC-Gators, FLA. TODAY, Oct. 7, 1992 (Gannett News Serv.).
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laws.26 Grow"s suit was part of a trend, as it was based in part on a
Florida statute that requires the NCAA to adhere to due process in
cases involving Florida's state universities.2 6' A similar statute in
Louisiana allowed a Louisiana State University football player to enjoin
the NCAA and play out his sefiior season.262
G. Schaill: An Example of Challenges to the Drug Testing of High
School Students
Courts have shown less resistance to drug testing student-athletes
who are minors. In contrast to the litigation involving universities'
programs, courts apply a lesser burden on high schools to justify the
drug testing of their student-athletes. In Schaill v. Tippecanoe County
School Corp.,63 Darcy Schaill, a high school swimmer, sued to en-
join her high school's unmonitored, random drug-testing program.264
The Seventh Circuit held that the testing was reasonable because high
school athletes have reduced privacy expectations and the school sys-
tem had a compelling interest to support its program.
Since the drug tests were unmonitored and the court found that the
athletes had a diminished expectation of privacy, the court held that the
tests were not as invasive as drug tests in other contexts.265 The court
260. Celeste E. Whittaker, Inside Colleges, ATLANTA J. & CONST., July 25, 1993, at
E2.
261. Id.; see FLA. STAT. § 240.5338-5349 (1991). A similar statute in Nevada was held
by the United States District Court for Nevada to violate the Commerce Clause of the Unit-
ed States Constitution. See NCAA v. Miller, 10 F.3d 633 (9th Cir. 1993). The statute in
Miller purported to apply due process to all proceedings -of the NCAA involving Nevada's
state universities. I. at 637.
A similar argument was raised by the NCAA in Hill, but was rejected by the Hill
II court. 273 Cal. Rptr. at 422-23. The NCAA argued that the Hill ruling destroyed the
uniformity of the NCAA's program and, therefore, imposed an undue burden on interstate
commerce. The court found the trial court's injunction was only an incidental burden on
commerce. Id. at 423.
262. Kerasotis, supra note 255.
263. 864 F.2d 1309 (7th Cir. 1988).
264. Id. at 1310.
265. Id at 1318. The court focused on the oft-cited proposition that the element of
communal undress reduces an athlete's privacy rights. Id. According to the court, the fact
that athletes are generally subject to a pre-participation medical examination also reduced
athletes' privacy rights. Id. The court stated:
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found that the high school athletes' participation in interscholastic ath-
letics subjected the students to extensive regulation of off-school be-
havior, which contributed to its finding that the program was reason-
able.266 The Schaill court concluded that extensive evidence of drug
use at one high school, and of drug-related athletic injuries, in addition
to national surveys of drug use by high school students, supported the
school system's interest in testing its athletes.267
Schaill illustrates the importance of introducing evidence of drug
use into the record in order to justify the need for drug testing. Be-
cause the athletes were young and in need of greater protection from
drugs, the court accepted largely circumstantial evidence of drug use in
the schools as establishing the school's interest in testing its student-
athletes. The Schaill court acknowledged, however, that the inquiry into
high school drug-testing programs was less stringent than the inquiry
into university level drug-testing programs because the former involved
young students.6 '
The combination of these factors makes it quite implausible that students competing
for positions on an interscholastic athletic team would have strong expectations of
privacy with respect to urine tests. We can, of course, appreciate that monitored
collection and subsequent testing of urine samples may be distasteful (although
plaintiffs' subjective evidence on this point was not powerful), but such procedures
can hardly come as a great shock or surprise under present-day circumstances. For
this reason, we believe that sports are quite distinguishable from almost any other
activity. Random testing of athletes does not necessarily imply random testing of
band members or the chess team.
Id. at 1319 (footnote omitted). The court's reasoning is troubling when it is applied to
young students. Young athletes are generally more sensitive to invasions of their privacy,
especially a more than casual observation of the highly personal act of urination. As the
court suggested, the plaintiff did not prove this assertion, but it is almost uncontrovertible
that high school athletes are more sensitive to their privacy during urination than most col-
lege athletes.
266. Id. at 1322. In another inquiry the court concluded that drug testing was the only
effective method of satisfying the school's goal of deterring drug use. Id. at 1321.
267. Id. at 1310-11, 1320-21. The Schaill court stated that there was substantial testimo-
ny at trial concerning the drug problem in the schools. The school also presented circum-
stantial testimony as to injuries suffered during athletic contests by drug-impaired athletes.
Id. at 1320-21.
268. High school athletes may have greater protection following the holding in Acton v.
Vernona Sch. Dist. 47J, 23 F.3d 1514 (9th Cir. 1994). The Ninth Circuit overturned a lower
court holding that found a high school's drug-testing program was constitutional. Analyzed
under the Fourth Amendment, the court found there was no compelling interest to conduct
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IV. LESSONS OF THE DRUG-TESTING LITIGATION
A. Addressing the Case Law
1. State Action
The state action requirement forecloses many Fourth Amendment
challenges. The Supreme Court's holding in Tarkanian conclusively
established that the NCAA will not be considered a state actor for
Fourth Amendment purposes. 269 Challenges predicated on a Fourth
Amendment unreasonable search argument thus cannot be brought
against the NCAA. Similarly, many private universities are not state
actors, and their drug-testing programs may only be challenged under
privacy laws that apply to non-state actors, such as in California.270
2. Diminished Expectation of Privacy
One defense that is often asserted by universities or the NCAA is
that the student-athlete enjoys a diminished expectation of privacy,
therefore, the search is reasonable despite its invasive aspects. The
reasons used to support this theory include: student-athletes are exten-
sively regulated and qualify under the warrantless search exception;
student-athletes often dress in a communal locker room atmosphere,
therefore, visual monitoring of urination is common and unintrusive;
and student-athletes often take medical examinations, so they are used
to drug-testing. The Hill III court's finding that the athletes had a
diminished expectation of privacy, although consistent from court to
court, is controverted by the finding of the Colorado Supreme Court in
testing. Id. at 1520, 1527. The court found that the athletes's expectation of privacy was not
diminished by virtue of their participation in athletics or their use of locker rooms. Id. at
1525. The court stated "[normal] locker room or restroom activities are a far cry from hav-
ing an authority figure watch, listen to, and gather the results of one's urination." Id.
269. For a further discussion of the state action issue, see supra notes 57, 65-69 and
accompanying text.
270. One commentator suggested that challenges to drug-testing programs in Florida,
New York and Montana are especially "ripe." Ted O'Neal, Comment, The Constitutionality
of NCAA Drug Testing: A Fine Specimen for Examination, 46 S.M.U. L. REV. 513, 552
(1992). This may explain the settlements in the Grow and Premock situations.
[Vol. 97:53
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Derdeyn III.27 In Skinner,272 the Supreme Court reasoned that em-
ployees in a "pervasively regulated industry," such as the railroad
workers, have a diminished expectation of privacy. Agreeing with the
Skinner Court, the Hill III court concluded that NCAA athletes have a
similarly diminished expectation of privacy because athletes are exten-
sively regulated.273 The Supreme Court of Colorado found that the
arguments for finding that athletes had a diminished expectation of
privacy were not supported by testimony at trial.274 Given sufficient
evidence that student-athletes are more extensively regulated than other
students, courts will most likely find that student-athletes have a dimin-
ished expectation of privacy, which significantly increases the drug-
testing organization's chances for victory.
The finding that athletes have a diminished expectation of privacy
suffers from several logical defects. First, arguing that monitored drug
tests are less invasive because athletes undress in a communal locker
room ignores a difference between the two activities. Undressing in a
locker room is permissive, while monitored urination is compulsory.
Moreover, comparison of the two does not take into account that the
purpose of the latter is the organized and systematic collection and use
of private information by the sponsoring institution. One can hardly
argue that an element of communal undress justifies this aspect of
monitored urination.275 However it could be argued that male athletes
using a communal urinal may experience a possible lessened
expectation of privacy.
Finally, the argument that the closely regulated nature of athletics
justifies the diminished expectation finding can be destroyed by the
271. However, the finding in Colorado may be attributed more to an evidentiary failure
by the University of Colorado than to a holding that all student-athletes do not have a di-
minished expectation of privacy.
272. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 627.
273. Hill III, 863 P.2d at 657; Hill 1, 273 Cal. Rptr. at 409-10.
274. Derdeyn 111, 863 P.2d at 945. See also Horsemen's, 532 N.E.2d at 650-51.
275. For example, the element of communal undress in locker rooms does not justify
an institution's photographing of students in their undressed state, then circulation of the
photographs to selected university officials, with possible sanctions against the students based
on the photographs. Similarly, more than an element of locker room communal undress is
required to justify systematic institutional collection and use of comparable chemical informa-
tion, with potential sanctions against students.
1994]
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process of reductio ad absurdum. This argument supports the drug
testing of all students who are closely regulated, such as teaching assis-
tants, band members and laboratory assistants. All of these students are
closely regulated, and many have a far greater impact on public safety
than athletes. Thus the diminished expectation finding is erroneous and
should be reconsidered.
3. Compelling and Legitimate Interests
Another aspect of the drug-testing litigation is the interests asserted
by drug-testers to justify drug testing college athletes. The interests
generally asserted are protection of the health and safety of college
athletes and preservation of fair athletic competition. Courts have ac-
corded these interests different weights.
The Derdeyn III court stated that CU's purposes were insignificant
because they involved athletics and did not impinge on matters of
national concern or public safety."' The Bally court, however, found
that an athlete's participation in intercollegiate athletics was a weak
interest in light of NU's purpose of protecting the health of its student-
athletes.277 In Hill III, the NCAA's interests were found to be legiti-
mate and extended as far as protecting the NCAA's reputation for
sponsoring fair athletic events. With a properly substantiated record, a
university or the NCAA could most likely establish that it had a legiti-
mate need to drug test student-athletes.
There is seeming consensus that the drug-testing organization only
needs to assert legitimate interests. The Colorado Supreme Court in
Derdeyn III stated that the Fourth Amendment only requires a showing
of a legitimate: interest. The California Supreme Court in Hill III also
found that the appropriate standard was a legitimate interests standard.
276. Derdeyn 111 ,863 P.2d at 945.
277. Bally, 532 N.E.2d at 53.
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4. Voluntary Consent
Most drug-testing programs require the athlete to consent to be
drug tested; if this consent was voluntarily given, the drug test can be
as invasive as necessary.278 However, most courts have held that the
sponsor of the drug testing bears the burden of proving that the con-
sent form was voluntarily signed. The issue of voluntary consent re-
volves around judicial acceptance of the "unconstitutional conditions"
doctrine.
A majority of the Justices of the Supreme Court of Colorado ac-
cepted the theory that denial of participation in intercollegiate athletics
was an unconstitutional condition that removed the voluntariness of the
athlete's consent. Both dissenters in Derdeyn III found that the govern-
mental benefit of participation in intercollegiate athletics was too insig-
nificant to constitute an "unconstitutional condition." The Massachusetts
Supreme Judicial Court also implicitly rejected the application of the
doctrine to the context of intercollegiate athletics. The doctrine is on
weak legal ground because participation in intercollegiate athletics is
probably not sufficient to trigger the doctrine, Derdeyn notwithstanding.
5. Questions of Law Versus Questions of Fact
Courts should explicitly address the issue of whether a drug testing
program is unreasonably or impermissibly invasive is a question of
fact, of law, or of ultimate fact, i.e. a mixed question of fact and
law.2 79 First, this is important in determining whether trial court con-
clusions should be reviewed under a de novo or clearly erroneous stan-
dard.
Appellate courts to date simply have not been consistent in their
treatment of lower court conclusions concerning the invasiveness and
reasonableness of NCAA and university sponsored drug testing pro-
grams. For example, in Derdeyn, the Colorado Supreme Court majori-
278. This argument was not raised in Hill.
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ty largely deferred to trial court findings, while in Hill the California
Supreme Court displayed little if any deference. Indeed, justices on
the same court have disagreed on the proper appellate standard.8 °
This issue is also significant concerning the type, amount, and
quality of proof required on the question of whether a program is
unreasonably or impermissively invasive. Evidentiary proof is unques-
tionably appropriate on issues of fact, issues of ultimate fact, and to
establish the absence of material factual dispute, e.g. a genuine issue of
material fact. However, little if any evidentiary "proof' is logically
necessary on a. question of pure law.
Resolution. of this issue would also likely help clarify the level of
deference one trial court should afford another, as it will clarify the
issues being addressed and the proofs directed to each issue. For ex-
ample, in O'Halloran, a federal court purported to largely ignore earli-
er state court conclusions on these questions, deferring instead to "ex-
pert findings" concerning the reasonableness of the NCAA's testing
procedures.28" '
The invasiveness of a particular program is not purely a question
of law. Rather, it depends on facts specific to the particular program
- for example whether it is voluntary or mandatory, the asserted in-
terests or needs justifying the program, the breadth of the substances
tested for, the testing procedures used, the information collected, the
individuals to whom such information will be circulated, the purposes
for which the information will be used, and the sanctions employed.
Likewise, the invasiveness of a specific program, or the needs or inter-
ests to be served by a specific program, are appropriate areas for factu-
al proofs.
However, neither is the permissibility or reasonableness of a par-
ticular program. purely a fact question."2 Rather, in that it involves
280. See, e.g., Derdeyn, supra notes 164-186; 863 P.2d at 938, 959 (majority conclud-
ing reasonableness issue under Colorado constitution resembled one of fact, dissenting justice
opining issue was one of law to be reviewed de novo).
281. See supra notes 208-209 and accompanying text.
282. For example, the Fourth Amendment prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures,
but the question of -whether a particular search or seizure was "unreasonable" is not purely a
question of fact. See, e.g., TL.O., supra, notes 206-208 and accompanying text. Likewise,
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both factual and legal components, the issue of whether a particular
program is impermissibly or unreasonably invasive is one of ultimate
fact.
Accordingly, practitioners should be prepared to present whatever
admissible evidence they believe is available to support their claims on
these subjects. They should be prepared to take a stance as to whether
a particular issue is one of fact, of law, or of ultimate fact. On ap-
peal, where the issue has not been resolved by a state Supreme Court
decision, they should be prepared also to argue whether the controlling
standard of review with respect to a particular issue is de novo or a
deferential standard such as a clearly erroneous one.
However, courts should also clarify for practitioners their analysis
on these questions. This requires that courts and practitioners distin-
guish between three different types of "ultimate fact" issues. First, the
trial court's resolution of disputed "historical" facts and credibility
issues should be reviewed under a clearly erroneous or comparably
deferential standard."3 Similarly, "where the trial court decides ulti-
mate facts which would go to the jury, and does so on motion because
witness credibility and demeanor are not implicated, a strong case for
deference exists."28 4  However, where the historical facts are undis-
puted, and the only question presented is whether the facts satisfy the
constitutional, statutory, or other legal standard, a de novo appellate
review standard may be appropriate.285 A particular case may present
a combination of issues which fall into different of these three basic
categories. Thus, courts and practitioners must be clear in addressing
which of these situations is present in a particular case.
the question of whether a particular program is unreasonable or impermissible under under
state privacy standards is not purely a question of fact. See, e.g., Derdeyn, supra notes
167-185 and accompanying text; 863 P.2d at 938, 959 (majority concluding issue of reason-
ableness under Colorado Constitution resembled one of fact, dissenting justice opining issue
was one of law to be reviewed de novo).
283. Cf Schwarzer, supra note 143 at 489-93.
284. Id. at 492.
285. Schwarzer states: "Where the decision is of ultimate facts of the kind appropriate
for decision by a court as questions of law, the case for deference is weaker. Nevertheless,
the appellate court may take into account the trial judge's long exposure, careful study and
greater familiarity with what may be a lengthy and complex documentary record.' Id
1994]
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B. If the NCAA Was a State Actor
Many university drug-testing programs follow or are based on the
NCAA's program. Thus the question arises: If the NCAA was con-
sidered a state actor would its drug-testing program survive a Fourth
Amendment challenge? The NCAA's program would have to survive
the two prongs of Skinner: reasonableness and reasonably tailored. The
NCAA could assert several defenses that will be addressed in Subsec-
tion 3.
1. The Reasonableness of the NCAA's Program
While a finding on this ground will vary from court to court,
certain tendencies can be identified. First, visual monitoring is general-
ly recognized as the most invasive aspect of the NCAA's program.
Second, the NCAA's interests are legitimate, but may not be compel-
ling. Although the Hill III and Derdeyn courts suggested that Colorado
University only needed to show a "legitimate" interest, the Derdeyn MI1
court found that Colorado University's interests were not legitimate.
Thus, the NCALA must build a record sufficient to survive a legitimate
interest inquiry. Third, NCAA athletes may have a diminished expecta-
tion of privacy, but a finding depends on an adequate record that can
draw parallels to the extensively regulated industry in Skinner. It is
likely that, given an adequate record, the NCAA's program would be
found to be reasonable.
2. The Overbreadth of the NCAA's Present Program
The NCAA must prove that its program satisfies the second prong
of the Skinner test: that testing is reasonably related in scope to
achieving the asserted goals of deterrence or disclosure of drug use.
There are two reasons why the NCAA's present program is not nar-
rowly tailored to meet its objectives. First, the NCAA's list of banned
substances is over-inclusive. The NCAA has little justification to sup-
port testing for substances such as strychnine. Second, the NCAA's
program inherently discloses irrelevant and private information. It is
[Vol. 97:53
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uncontroverted that irrelevant information is revealed by the tests and
thus is disclosed to testing officials." 6
To defend its program in future litigation, the NCAA must tailor
its testing to the furtherance of legitimate interests. Due to the over-
breadth of its list of banned drugs, some of the NCAA's tests have no
legitimate purpose."7 Thus, the NCAA should reduce its list of
banned drugs to those substances most frequently used by athletes and
which relate to the NCAA's interests in ensuring equitable competition
and protecting the health of its athletes. The NCAA should also strive
to improve the methodology of its tests so that it can avoid cases such
as Reynolds v. IAAF z88 or potential challenges such as the Monty
Grow case.
3. Building a Record to Support Testing Programs
As noted above, the NCAA's drug testing program should be nar-
rowed to more directly further the goals of preserving fair competition
and protecting the health and safety of college athletes. Thus moni-
tored, random testing without demonstrated relation to these purposes is
likely to be invalidated. Accordingly, the resolution of a challenge to a
drug-testing program is likely to turn on the state of the record as to:
1) whether the drugs that are the focus of the program have been
linked to unfair competition; and 2) whether the assertions of protect-
ing the health and safety of student-athletes are substantiated by specif-
ic evidence of a drug use problem among the target population.
Courts such as the O'Halloran III court. 9 have been willing to
recognize that the preservation of fair competition is at least a legiti-
286. Derdeyn 11, 832 P.2d at 1033.
287. See Hill I, No. 619209, at 33-35.
288. 841 F. Supp. 1444 (S.D. Ohio 1992). After testing positive for steroids, Butch
Reynolds, a world record-holding sprinter, was granted a permanent injunction allowing him
to compete in the U.S. Olympic Trials against the wishes of the International Amateur Ath-
letic Federation (IAAF). Id. at 1447. Reynolds was successful in introducing sufficient evi-
dence to create a substantial doubt as to the validity of the IAAF's chain of custody. Id.
Reynolds identified various problems in the handling of his urine sample that the court
found contributed to the possibility in that the test's result was erroneous. Id.
289. See O'Halloran IlL 679 F. Supp. at 1005.
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mate interest. The follow-up question, however - whether the
substances targeted by the drug tests are proved to unfairly affect ath-
letic competition - must also be addressed. As stated by the Hill trial
court, it has not been proved that drugs necessarily enhance athletic
performance.29 Accordingly, if the NCAA is serious in its articulated
goals of ensuring fair competition, its testing program should be limit-
ed to substances that are demonstrated to be performance-enhancing.
Testing for over three thousand banned substances is also not justi-
fiable on the grounds that an analysis of the percentage of athletes
testing positive for certain substances indicates that the problem seems
primarily limited to steroid use.29" ' For instance, in the first half of
1992 athletes tested positive only for steroids or steroids-related sub-
stances, except for one positive test for excessive caffeine.292 Thus,
the NCAA should only test for those substances that are either preva-
lently used by college athletes; or are demonstrated to be performance
enhancing or to constitute a significant health threat.
4. The Conflicting Roles of the University
An ancillary question raised by the drug testing litigation is, what
is the proper role of the university? Athletes who fail NCAA drug tests
must convince not only the NCAA and possibly the courts to allow
them to participate, they must also convince their own schools. Be-
cause the team penalties for allowing an ineligible athlete to participate
are severe, 293 universities are unlikely to risk NCAA sanctions to al-
low one athlete to participate.
A university has conflicting obligations to the NCAA and to its
students. These obligations create a three-way struggle between the
student, the NCAA and the university. Of course, in challenges to
university-mandated programs, the university is an adverse party to the
290. Hill I, No. 619209, at 8. For a further discussion of the court's conclusion that
none of the NCAA's banned substances aid performance, see supra note 81 and accompany-
ing text.
291. See Year-Round Steroid Testing, supra note 28, at 1.
292. Very Few Athletes Fail Drug Testing Program, NCAA NEWS, Sept. 2, 1992, at 6.
293. For a further discussion of team penalties, see supra note 4.
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student. Similarly, before the court has addressed the validity of the
NCAA's program, it is reasonable for the university to align itself with
the NCAA. The university's alignment with the NCAA is arguably
motivated by fear of NCAA sanctions. As such, it is difficult for a
university to align itself based on the merits of a case.
Once there has been a judicial declaration that the NCAA's pro-
gram is invalid, the university's interests diverge from the NCAA's
interest in uniform application of its program and uniform regulation of
college sports. The university must then weigh compliance with a court
order against potential NCAA-sanctions. To protect themselves univer-
sities must seek injunctions to prohibit the NCAA from enforcing its
sanctions.294
C. Conclusions: Defensible Programs and the Correct Standard
Universities are taking a risk when they rely on the consent provi-
sion to demonstrate that the student-athlete has voluntarily waived any
privacy rights. Several courts have indicated that these consent provi-
sions can be viewed as coercive, depending on the court's view of the
significance of athletic participation. Consent is perceived by the athlete
as a necessary step for obtaining scholarships or pursuing a profession-
al athletic or coaching career after college. It is also the university's
burden to prove that consent was given voluntarily, which is not easy
task. Thus, the consent form is not necessarily dispositive and should
not be relied upon by the NCAA or the university's counsel.
Because the visual monitoring of urination has been deemed par-
ticularly invasive, alternatives to it should be considered. As one court
suggested, there are alternatives to monitoring, such as dyes in the
toilet and checks on the sample temperature, which ensure the athlete
has given a proper sample."'5 Removing this invasive aspect of the
test increases the probability that the test will be upheld.
Likewise, where there is adequate preparation by the university or
the NCAA's counsel, where there is evidence supporting the need for
294. See O'Halloran III, 672 F. Supp. at 1380.
295. Schaill, 864 F.2d at 1321-22.
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drug testing, and the chemical lists, testing procedures, circulation of
information, and sanctions are narrowly tailored to address that need,
the tests are more likely to be upheld.
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